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INTRODUCTION

Wisconsin has been in the forefront of many important innovations
throughout its legal history.' The innovations have fostered distinct
legal doctrine in various areas that in turn have been both praised and
criticized, as is to be expected.2
This Article explores Wisconsin's unique approach to the
admissibility of expert testimony, a seemingly mundane, technical issue
yet one of central importance to the judicial system. Nearly every civil
case of consequence, and many criminal cases, relies on expert
testimony.3 The cost and complexity of expert evidence often drives
decisions by lawyers about whether to take a case in the first instance.
And concerns about the admissibility of expert testimony may strongly
influence decisions to settle a case prior to trial. Finally, it cannot be
gainsaid that expert testimony may have a critical effect on the outcome
of cases that are tried.
Wisconsin's uniqueness rests in its adherence to what is called the
relevancy test for admitting expert evidence.
Simply put, expert
testimony is admissible if it is relevant, the witness is qualified based on
his or her "specialized knowledge," and the testimony will assist the trier
of fact in better understanding the evidence or determining a fact in
issue. The reliability of the expert's reasoning, methodology, or tests are
left to the trier of fact as matters of weight. Nearly all other jurisdictions
impose more formidable thresholds for admissibility. The Federal Rules
of Evidence mandate that the trial judge serve as a "gatekeeper" who
must find that the expert's principles, methods, and tests, along with
their application, are reliable according to prevailing standards in the
field of expertise. Most states now follow some variant of the federal
approach, although many still adhere to the common law standard,
which asks whether the expert's methods were those "generally
accepted" by the community of experts (the "Frye" standard). 4
1. See generally JOSEPH A. RANNEY, TRUSTING NOTHING TO PROVIDENCE: A
HISTORY OF WISCONSIN'S LEGAL SYSTEM (1999).

2. See, e.g., Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 89 MARQ. L.
REV. 723 (2006).
3. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 67 (6th ed. 2006) ("In
the past two decades, the use of expert witnesses has skyrocketed.").
4. Two of the most careful and widely recognized students of expert evidence have
grouped the fifty states, the federal courts, and the military courts according to the various
standards of expert admissibility. PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 1.13-.15 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2005). For present purposes, there
are three standards: (1) the Daubert/Kumho Tire reliability test, (2) the Frye "general
acceptance" test, and (3) the relevancy test. All three are discussed more fully in this Article.
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Wisconsin case law, as we will see, has explicitly rejected both the
federal reliability standard and the general acceptance test; its relevancy

standard thus represents a "third way" that falls well outside the
mainstream of prevailing evidence doctrine. The distinction is welcome.
Applying sophisticated quantitative methodologies, one recent study
concluded that there is no "practical difference" between the Frye test
and the reliability standard.5 If a uniform evidence rule is the goal, the
authors argue, states should adopt the Daubert test and eschew
"doctrinal differences in name only." 6 But if states are to play the role
of "laboratories of legal process," then meaningful "variation and
experimentation should be embraced." 7

The relevancy test offers a substantively distinct alternative to the
federal reliability rule that is built upon a vastly different set of

assumptions, namely, a commitment to and confidence in the modern
adversary trial. In contrast, the federal approach evinces a distinct
distrust of the adversary trial and lay fact finding, despite protests to the
contrary, and is more attuned to summary judgment adjudication than
trial.

Under the relevancy test, the strengths and weaknesses of an

expert's testimony are, one assumes, sufficiently exposed through crossexamination and impeachment before a trier of fact capable of sorting
through the issues; it is unnecessary for trial judges to first screen the
testimony for reliability, especially as judges may be no better equipped

for the task than the lay jury. Thus, the relevancy test strives to assure
fair adversary trials, not arbitrate scientific disputes. This said, federal

developments have, however, affected Wisconsin's relevancy approach,

See infra text accompanying notes 46-55 (Daubert/Kumho Tire), 30 (Frye), and 70-75 (the
relevancy test). According to Giannelli and Imwinkelried, it appears that the military courts
and thirty-one states follow the lead of the federal courts by applying a reliability test. Id. §§
1.13-.14. Sixteen states and the District of Columbia adhere to the Frye general acceptance
test. Alabama employs both tests, depending on the nature of the scientific evidence. See id.
§§ 1.13-.15. Only Wisconsin and North Carolina appear to follow variations of the relevancy
test. See infra note 74-76.
5. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 511 (2005). More to the point, "the
skirmishing between the champions of Frye and Daubertyields few benefits and creates more
confusion than anything else." Id. at 503-04.
6. Id. at 504.
7. Id. Cheng and Yoon's "findings suggest that future attempts to improve the handling
of scientific evidence in the courts could be more effective if advocates for rigorous use of
scientific evidence shifted their focus away from tinkering with doctrinal tests and instead
toward 'softer' solutions that increase the judiciary's understanding of scientific concepts and
processes." Id.
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transforming it in subtle, important ways that nonetheless reaffirm its
faith in adjudication by trial.
The changes reflect a doctrinal dialogue, if you will, between the
relevancy rule and the federal reliability standard, or more precisely, the

proponents of each.

While clearly and emphatically rejecting the

federal standard and the Frye test, Wisconsin case law nonetheless

recognizes the very real concerns about fringe experts and questionable
practices.

The result is an emerging body of law that has retuned the

relevancy test in a way that provides trial judges with the means of
limiting and excluding expert testimony where appropriate while

remaining faithful to the assistance standard. Of particular importance
are cases discussing the qualifications of experts and recognizing a
"limited gatekeeping" function for trial judges.8 In no sense, however,
has the test become some version of "Daubert-lite."
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the subtle transformation of

the relevancy test and to offer some suggestions for its application in
civil litigation.9 Two broad questions inform the discussion. First, does
Wisconsin law adequately address challenges presented by speculative
or unfounded expert testimony? Second, does the case law manifest a

need to change the rules, particularly in ways that risk distorting the role
of the adversary trial and the jury in fact finding?
In addressing these questions, we will first examine the origins of the
relevancy rule and its underlying rationale, which were firmly
entrenched in Wisconsin case law when the Rules of Evidence were
adopted in the mid-1970s. The prime rule on expert testimony, section
907.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes,"° furthers the relevancy test's strong
preference for providing assistance (specialized knowledge) whenever it
might be helpful to the trier of fact. What to do with speculative or
8. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 24.04, at 321 (2d ed. 2006).
Professor Giannelli concludes that the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), has had perhaps the "most profound," yet "least
noticed," effect on the relevancy test, where a "number of courts" that had rejected Frye
(general acceptance) before Daubert "now claim that Daubert is consistent with their former
approach." Id. Giannelli concludes that this may be "true in some instances but not in
others." Id. Wisconsin's rejection of both Frye and Daubert place it outside this class of cases
as well.
9. There are several reasons for this focus. First, experts are used more frequently and
on a wider range of issues in civil litigation than they are in criminal cases. Second, and more
important, the constitution constrains prosecutors and enables defendants in the use of expert
testimony over and above the demands of the evidentiary rules. See State v. St. George, 2002
WI 50, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777. Our focus is on those evidence rules, not the stilldeveloping constitutional doctrines.
10. WIS. STAT. § 907.02 (2003-2004).
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uncertain expert testimony, however, remains an issue. The explicit
rejection of both the general acceptance and the federal reliability
standards rests on grounds that they are "alien" to Wisconsin law;
experience had shown that lay juries could adequately weigh expert
testimony and that reliability determinations may themselves be
arbitrary."
Yet there are limits. Case law assigns Wisconsin judges a "limited
gatekeeping" function. Part III explores the "authentication" of expert
testimony, an as yet largely overlooked issue. Briefly stated, although
Wisconsin cases hold that reliability goes to the weight of the evidence,
the principle of authentication and the doctrine of conditional relevancy
impose an important, although often ignored, threshold. The trial judge
must first determine whether a reasonable jury could find the expert's
principles, methods, tests, or reasoning reliable.
Parts IV and V offer a comprehensive discussion of the limited
gatekeeping function and its implications. Limited gatekeeping, which
also embraces the authentication foundation, means more than weighing
evidence under section 904.03's balancing test, which is strongly tilted in
Rather, section 907.02 carries its own
favor of admissibility.
discretionary, flexible assistance standard that allows judges to exclude,
limit, or otherwise shape expert testimony when its probative value is
offset by, or evenly balanced against, concerns that it is superfluous, a
waste of time, or confusing.
Part VI discusses the relevancy test today, examining each of its core
The Article
elements-relevancy, qualifications, and assistance.
contends that the relevancy test has been subtly reshaped and refocused
in light of concerns about fringe experts, the debate over the federal
reliability standard, and the recognition of a limited gatekeeping
function. First, the threshold requirement that the expert's testimony be
"relevant"' 12 has been used to exclude opinions and methodology that
are speculative, uncertain, confusing, or otherwise completely unhelpful;
in effect, the experts are speaking a language that cannot be usefully
translated in the courtroom. It is recommended that in appropriate
cases, particularly those raising questions about the reliability of an
expert's methods or test, the trial court should also consider the

11. If a choice is to be made between subjecting the expert's methods to an "adversarial
test" or a "scientific test," Wisconsin law clearly favors the former. See GIANNELLI, supra
note 8, § 24.10, at 333 (quoting United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (depublished)).
12. WIS. STAT. § 904.02 (2003-2004).
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authentication requirement of section 909.01(1) along with the threshold
issue of relevancy under section 904.02. The second and third
elements-qualifications and assistance-have been most dramatically
affected by the limited gatekeeping function. An expert's qualifications
should be assessed on a question-by-question basis; so-called "field"
findings are inappropriate. Qualifications themselves are an index of
how much (if any) specialized knowledge the witness possesses, whether
gained through formal education or experience. This approach is
explored in discussions of two important cases, Martindalev. Ripp13 and
Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc. 4

The critical point is that

qualifications largely determine the range of possible assistance an
expert may provide. Indeed, the argument is that qualifications and
assistance perform in tandem much like an algebraic function:
qualifications (the domain) define the scope of possible assistance (the
range). And it is the trial judge, using the limited gatekeeping authority,
who has the discretion to choose the form and content of the expert's
testimony from among the range of possible assistance. Thus, the judge
may restrict the expert to exposition (a lecture) on the specialized
subject matter without reference to the facts of the case or otherwise
limit the expert's opinion testimony. In any event, the proper exercise
of the trial judge's discretion is immeasurably enhanced by the informed
interplay of objections and offers of proof by trial counsel.
II. NEW RULES, OLD PROBLEMS: RELEVANCY, GENERAL
ACCEPTANCE, AND RELIABILITY STANDARDS

Courts have anguished over the admissibility of expert testimony
ever since the law of evidence took upon itself the task of regulating the
formal use of proof at trial. 5 Over the last fifty years, state and federal
case law reflect three competing, shifting, and sometimes overlapping
approaches: (1) the Frye or "general acceptance" standard; (2) the
reliability standard now ensconced in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence; 16 and (3) the relevancy test.
The focus in this Part is
13. 2001 WI 113, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698.
14. 2001 WI 109, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727.
15. See, e.g., Learned Hand, Historical and PracticalConsiderations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 56 (1901) (arguing that because of their "practical
inconvenience," partisan expert witnesses should be excluded in favor of an "advisory
tribunal" of independent experts with the ultimate power to decide esoteric issues). See also
TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 4 (2004).

16. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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Wisconsin's embrace of the relevancy test and the courts' reasons for
rebuffing Frye and federal reliability standards.

In 1974, Wisconsin became one of the first states to adopt the then
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, even before their formal adoption

by the federal judiciary. 8 Although solidly rooted in the common law,
the federal model included innovative rules on expert testimony that
Wisconsin fully embraced. 9 Section 907.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes,

governing the admissibility of expert opinion testimony, provides:
907.02 Testimony by experts. If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.20
It is identical to the original Rule 702 (since amended in 2000) and has
remained unchanged since 1974.21
What was innovative about the rule? Many common law authorities
had woodenly proclaimed that expert testimony should be permitted
only when the subject was beyond the "ken of a lay jury,"2 2 that is, over
the heads of persons of ordinary education and experience. The new
rule rejected the common law's esoteric, often arbitrary approach in

17. See generally GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 24.04, at 314.
18. Wisconsin adopted the proposed federal rules in June 1973; they became effective in
January 1974. Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1 (1973) (promulgation of the Rules of Evidence
for Wisconsin). For a history of the drafting, revision, and adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence by the states, see CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 5006-07 (Supp. 2005).
19. More precisely, Wisconsin adopted sections 702 through 705 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence as proposed in the so-called Revised Draft. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18, §
5007, at 112 n.7. At the same time, Wisconsin created section 907.07 of the Wisconsin
Statutes, which permits experts to read their reports into evidence. Section 907.07 was based
on Model Rule of Evidence 408. Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d at R219 (judicial council
committee's note on the promulgation of section 907.07).
20. WIS. STAT. § 907.02 (2003-2004).
21. The federal version was amended in 2000 to conform to the Daubert-Kumho Tire
doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 46, 51.
22. GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 24.03, at 308 n.8 (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 307
F.2d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
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favor of an "assist-the-jury" standard that welcomed experts' specialized

knowledge wherever it might "help" the jury better decide the case.23
Yet for Wisconsin, the new rule represented vindication and
clarification more than it did innovation. Decades earlier the Wisconsin
Supreme Court embraced an assistance standard that reposed discretion
in the trial judge to determine when an expert might help the jury better
understand the issues:
The test or principal rule of admissibility of expert
testimony is "whether the members of the jury having
that knowledge and general experience common to every
member of the community would be aided in a
of the issues by the testimony offered and
consideration
24
received."

23. Id. § 24.03, at 308. Giannelli observes that the common law's "necessity" standard
was not uniformly observed and that influential commentators, such as Dean Mason Ladd
and John Henry Wigmore, favored more liberal "assistance" standards. Id.
24. State v. Johnson, 54 Wis. 2d 561, 564-65, 196 N.W.2d 717, 719 (1972) (quoting
Anderson v. Eggert, 234 Wis. 348, 361, 291 N.W. 365 (1940)). Johnson upheld the
admissibility of testimony by an "experienced" drug user that the pill he took was LSD, a
controlled substance: "As an extensive user of a dangerous drug who experienced its effects
over 100 times and who has seen its effect on other people, Bernstein had special knowledge
of the drug and we think he would qualify to give his opinion." Id. at 566, 196 N.W.2d at 720.
Johnson in turn relied upon Anderson v. Eggert, 234 Wis. 348, 359, 291 N.W. 365, 370 (1940)
("In many courts it is held that the qualification of an expert, that is, whether by reason of
special skill or knowledge he can be of assistance to the jury, is a matter wholly for the trial
court." (citing 1 WIGMORE EVIDENCE 963 (2d ed.)).

Anderson upheld the trial judge's

decision to permit testimony by two University of Wisconsin physicists in a car accident case:
The expert witnesses in this case were not asked to state the laws of
physics, but on the contrary were asked hypothetical questions based
upon facts appearing in the evidence. They were asked to state, as a
matter of expert knowledge, what would have happened to the Anderson
car and the Eggert car if the conditions were as claimed by appellant as
stated in the hypothetical question. They were also asked to answer a
hypothetical question which embodied the facts as claimed by Eggert. In
reaching their conclusion they applied their expert knowledge of the laws
of physics. They were not asked, and they did not undertake to say,
where the collision took place. Whether the testimony was properly
received in this case depends upon whether the members of the jury having
that knowledge and general experience common to every member of the
community would be aided in a considerationof the issues by the testimony
offered and received. That the expert witnesses had knowledge of the
results of the application of force under varying circumstances not
possessed by an ordinary person seems self-evident. While the witnesses
may not have experimented with colliding automobiles, they were
possessed of special knowledge of the laws of physics and the behavior of
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Section 907.02 embodied this very same approach and thus portended
no dramatic shift in doctrine or practice.25 In short, trials need not be
bogged down by questions about whether a subject is or is not within the
purview of common sense and lay experience before permitting expert
testimony. The goal is to educate the trier of fact, and if the jury already
about the subject, what harm comes from the added
knows something
26
insight?
The assistance standard did not, however, address a second

nettlesome and perhaps more intractable problem: How should courts
distinguish proffered expert testimony that is speculative and uncertain
from that which is truly of assistance? 2 Whatever its value in providing
bodies to which force is applied under given conditions. Just as a lay
person may not be able to make a proper diagnosis although all the
symptoms are present and within his knowledge that are within the
knowledge of the physician, so a person without specialknowledge may not
know how movable bodies will operate under a given set of circumstances.
It is considered that the trial court was not in error in permitting the
expert witnesses to testify. Its instructions were well calculated to prevent
the jury from attaching undue weight to the testimony of the experts.
234 Wis. at 360-61, 291 N.W.2d at 370-71 (emphasis added).
25. See WIs. STAT. § 907.02 (2003-2004) judicial council committee's notes; see also Sup.
Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R207 (1973) (citing cases, including Johnson, 54 Wis. 2d 561, 196
N.W.2d 717).
26. The Wisconsin Supreme Court clearly stated this policy in State v. Watson:
Under Wis. Stat. § 907.02, if a witness is qualified as an expert and has
specialized knowledge that is relevant because it will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, the expert's
analysis or opinion will normally be admitted into evidence. That a lay
witness of ordinary intelligence may also understand the subject matter
does not mean that the opinion of an expert in the field would not be of
assistance to the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining
a fact in issue. As a general rule, then, it is not an erroneous exercise of
discretion for the court to admit expert testimony so long as the testimony
aids the trier of fact in consideration of the issues.
227 Wis. 2d 167, 187, 595 N.W.2d 403, 412 (1999) (footnotes and citations omitted).
27. GIANNELLI, supra note 8, §§ 24.02, 24.04, at 307, 310. Giannelli, building on the
insights of the great evidence scholar John M. Maguire, graphically depicts the subject matter
of expert testimony in a chart that demarcates three distinct areas:
Expert Testimony

Speculative-Uncertain
A

Commonplace
B

Id. § 24.02, at 307 (citing JOHN M. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON

LAW 30 (1947)).
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expert assistance to juries, Rule 702, and therefore section 907.02,
provided less direction on how to approach supposedly unreliable
expert testimony.
To be sure, many expert subjects posed little
problem: opposing parties relying on similar experts might not raise any
such challenge (e.g., medical doctors); statutes occasionally sanctioned a
given technology (e.g., speed detection, DNA); and the court could
always take judicial notice of a science or technology when
appropriate. 8 Absent such opportunities, however, the parties had to
authenticate the contested principle, method, or test. Yet the courts
themselves disagreed over what standard applied.29
By the mid-1980s, federal and state courts were constructing Rule
702 in very different ways. For example, the Seventh Circuit assumed
that scientific evidence remained subject to the venerable common law
Frye standard: is the theory, test, or technique generally accepted by the
pertinent scientific community?3" The Third Circuit cut its own path.
Repudiating Frye and its "process of scientific 'nose-counting,"' it
broached a "flexible" reliability test that foreshadowed Daubert yet also
emphasized the key features of the relevancy test.3" Many states that
had adopted the federal model also continued to apply the Frye
standard despite trenchant criticism that it was difficult to apply,
excluded reliable testimony that had yet to win the mantle of general
acceptance, and sometimes "obscure[d]" problems with a particular
technique by preferring a "one-size-fits-all" approach. 2
Others contended that the federal rules, especially Rule 702, had
displaced Frye's general acceptance analysis with the relevancy test, a
heterodox approach with a distinguished pedigree that included the first
edition of McCormick's great evidence treatise in the early 1950s. In
essence, a qualified expert should be permitted to testify about relevant
matters that might assist the jury; no further standards were needed. Its
proponents argued that the relevancy test conformed to the sweeping
definition of "relevant" evidence in Rule 401, the marked preference for

28. See DANIEL D. BLINKA, WISCONSIN EVIDENCE § 702.202 (2d ed. 2001) (collecting
authority). Trial courts may take judicial notice based on section 902.01 (scientific facts that
are beyond reasonable dispute) or legal precedent. GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 24.04, at 311.
29. See GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 24.04, at 311-12.
30. United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1981) (discussing Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). See also GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 24.04[A], at
312-13; Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
31. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1985).
32. GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 24.04[A], at 313.
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admitting all relevant evidence established by Rule 401,
33 and by Rule
702's generous assistance standard for experts generally.
When confronting this issue in the mid-1980s, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Walstad reaffirmed its adherence to
the relevancy approach based on decades-old case law, the text of the
evidence rules, and policy grounds. 4 Walstad seemed a peculiar case for
considering the admissibility of novel expert (scientific) testimony.
There had been no trial and the broader issue on appeal concerned a
defense motion to suppress because the police had destroyed allegedly
exculpatory evidence, namely, chemical-filled ampoules used in testing
the defendant's breath in a drunk driving investigation. 35 The trial judge
heard expert testimony by each side and ruled that retesting the
ampoules (the defendant's alleged goal) would yield nothing pertinent
to the accuracy of the original breath test. 6 In so concluding, the trial
judge stated that the "'Frye test remains the accepted standard for
And in making this last
admissibility of scientific testimony.' ' 37
assertion, the trial judge erred.
The Walstad court explicitly repudiated Frye as the threshold test for
admitting expert evidence and used the occasion to elaborate upon the
elements of, and policy underlying, the relevancy approach. First, the
court confessed that its case law discussions "of Frye had not been
marked by certainty or consistency," but now clarified that "[t]he Frye
concept is alien to the Wisconsin law of evidence., 38 Although "general
acceptance" might serve as a basis for judicial notice, contested expert
testimony is admissible provided the witness is qualified, the issue is
33. See Giannelli, supra note 30, at 1232-45 (discussing the relevancy test in light of
Federal Rules of Evidence 401-03 before the 2000 amendments). See also id. at 1203-04,
1229-30 (addressing the pre-Daubertuncertainty over whether the federal rules adopted the
Frye standard or the relevancy standard). Writing in 1980, Giannelli skillfully explained how
the federal rules conformed to the relevancy standard. In particular, Rule 402 declares that
all relevant evidence shall be admitted unless excluded by other rules. FED. R. EVID. 402.
Rule 401 expansively defines relevancy and Rule 403's balancing test assures that all relevant
evidence is admissible unless substantially outweighed by other considerations. FED. R.
EVID. 401, 403.
34. State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483,515-19, 351 N.W.2d 469, 485-87 (1984).
35. Id. at 485, 351 N.W.2d at 471.
36. Id. at 486, 351 N.W.2d at 471.
37. Id. at 515, 351 N.W.2d at 485 (quoting the record).
38. Id. at 515-16, 351 N.W.2d at 485-86. To illustrate the confused state of evidence law
before Walstad, see Marvin C. Holz, A Survey of Rules Governing Medical Proofin Wisconsin
- 1970, 1970 WIS. L. REV. 989, 1005-06 (1970), where one of Wisconsin's most skilled and
learned trial judges concluded that the "general acceptance" standard governed the
admissibility of expert medical testimony.
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relevant, and the testimony will assist the trier of fact.3 9 In emphasizing
the trinity of relevance, qualifications, and assistance, Walstad relied on
established precedent as well as the Judicial Council's commentary to

section 907.02. 4' The court's confidence in the adversary trial,
particularly cross-examination and impeachment, provided sufficient
assurance that triers of fact (i.e., juries) would not give undue weight to
flawed expertise:

The fundamental determination of admissibility comes at
the time the witness is "qualified" as an expert. In a state
such as Wisconsin, where substantially unlimited crossexamination is permitted, the underlying theory or
principle on which admissibility is based can be attacked
by cross-examination or by other types of impeachment.
Whether a scientific witness whose testimony is relevant
is believed is a question of credibility for the finder of
fact, but it clearly is admissible.'
39. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d at 516, 351 N.W.2d at 486. In rejecting Frye, the court also
politely dismissed a "reliability" approach advocated by Paul Giannelli in his "excellent
article," one that foreshadowed the reliability standard now embedded in Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. Id. at 519 n.13, 351 N.W.2d at 487 n.13 (discussing Giannelli, supra note 30).
40. Id. at 518, 351 N.W.2d at 486-87 (discussing Watson v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 264, 219
N.W.2d 398 (1974)). The Judicial Council Committee's note to section 907.02 states:
Fear of encroachment upon the function of the trier of the fact prompted
the negative view that the propriety of expert testimony was dependent
upon the need of the trier of fact for enlightenment. More rational is an
affirmative approach to the use of expert testimony predicated upon
whether such testimony will assist the trier of the fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. With such a test expert testimony
will usually be admissible and will only be excluded if superfluous and a
waste of time.
Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1,R207 (1973).
41. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d at 518-19, 351 N.W.2d at 487. The court quoted a Louisiana
decision, State v. Cantanese, 363 So. 2d 975, 979 (La. 1979), that had adopted a rationale
consistent with Wisconsin case law:
"The 'general acceptance' standard has been the subject of considerable
scholarly criticism in recent years. In particular, it has been suggested that
the requirement of 'general acceptance' is tantamount to a requirement
that the validity of the test be susceptible of such demonstration as to
enable the trial court to take judicial notice of the fact. Clearly, the
criteria used for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence should
not require the instant and unquestionable demonstration required for the
judicial notice of scientific facts. Other types of scientific evidence have
been admitted into evidence under less stringent standards which merely
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Moreover, the trial judge may exclude expert testimony that is
"superfluous or a waste of time. 4 2 In sum, the foundational elements of
qualifications, relevancy, and assistance, combined with wide-open
cross-examination and other rules of impeachment, provided the
appropriate adversary safeguards. Just as it was unnecessary to erect a

rigid barrier to guard the border between lay common sense and an
expert's specialized knowledge, the court also approved a permeable

zone at the other end of this continuum where specialized knowledge
shades into untested, uncertain theories, methods, and speculation.
The relevancy test, like the Frye standard, has always had its critics.
A lay jury's capability to understand and evaluate questionable
assertions by experts lacks empirical support. Doubts also exist about
whether the adversary trial provides a meaningful filter for unreliable
expert testimony. 4 "The major flaw in the relevancy analysis," observes
Professor Paul Giannelli, "is its failure to recognize the distinctive
problems of scientific evidence. In assessing probative value under this
approach, the judge frequently is forced to defer to an expert, thereby
permitting admissibility based on the views of a single individual in
some cases." 4 As the use of trial experts blossomed under Rule 702's
assistance standard, shrill declarations that "junk science" permeated
courtrooms tended
to drown out more nuanced concerns expressed by
45
other critics.

require the evidence to be 'an aid to the jury' or 'reliable enough to be
probative ....' This is the relevancy test of our rules and we adhere to it.
It is clear, therefore, that the trial judge's reliance upon Frye does not find
support in the law of evidence of Wisconsin.
Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d. at 519, 351 N.W.2d at 487 (footnotes omitted).
42. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d. at 516, 351 N.W.2d at 486.
43. See Giannelli, supra note 30, at 1239-45. In critiquing the adversary trial process,
Giannelli focused on criminal proceedings, especially the lack of notice and discovery that
prevailed when he wrote in the late 1970s. See id. Some, but not all, of the concerns he
raised-lack of notice, discovery, and defense experts-have been addressed by subsequent
changes in criminal procedure. Modem rules of civil procedure, of course, allow for extensive
discovery of expert opinion testimony.
44. Id. at 1250. Elsewhere, Giannelli has observed that the relevancy test "often means
that qualifying the expert automatically qualifies the technique."
GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, § 1-6, at 30. See also GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 24.04[B], at
314; Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 640-41

(1988) (criticizing the relevancy test's reliance on the adversary trial process and discussing
Watson v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 264, 219 N.W.2d 398 (1974)).
45. See, for example, PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE

COURTROOM 20-23 (1991), for one of "junk science's" most vitriolic critics.

For a less
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In the 1990s, the federal courts adopted a reliability standard that is
now set forth in Rule 702, as amended in 2000. The story is well
known.46 The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc. held that "the Frye test was superseded by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4 7 The "baseline" for
admissibility is the "liberal" relevancy rules-Rules 401 and 402-and
the Rule 702 assistance standard.48 The Court further expressed its
confidence in the adversary trial.4 9 Nonetheless, federal trial judges
must serve as gatekeepers to ensure that expert assistance is founded
upon reliable specialized knowledge, not speculation or unsupported
theories, that "fit" the facts of.the case. Daubert suggested that when
assessing reliability, the gatekeeper judges look to such factors as
whether the expert's principles and methods have been tested, subjected
to peer review, possess a known rate of error, or are generally accepted
(Frye demoted) by experts in the field. In Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, the Supreme Court held that the reliability standard
extended to all experts, including those whose specialized knowledge
arises from experience; it was not limited to "scientific" experts. 0 In
2000, Rule 702 was amended to reflect Daubertand Kumho Tire:
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.

splenetic viewpoint, see Giannelli, supra note 30, at 1199-1200, discussing the "everincreasing use of scientific evidence."
46. See, e.g., GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 24.04, at 314-22.
47. 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
48. Id. at 587-88.
49. Id. at 596 ("Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.").
50. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
51. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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In explaining the new rule, the federal Advisory Committee
emphasized the broad discretion reposed in the gatekeeper judges, who
may consider any number of factors in determining the reliability of the
expert's principles, methods, or tests.12 The Committee also reiterated

its confidence in the adversary trial process, especially the virtues of
"vigorous cross-examination,"53 impeachment, and cautionary jury
instructions while also clarifying that "this amendment is not intended to
provide an excuse for an automatic challenge to the testimony of every
expert."'
Nonetheless, amended Rule 702 augmented the Daubert
inquiry by requiring that judges also find that the expert's principles and

methods were reliably applied to the facts of the case, not simply that
they were reliable in and of themselves.5 In sum, the federal courts
heavily hedged their faith in the adversary trial by posting judges at the
gates of admissibility with orders to admit only reliable expert

testimony, as best they could determine it.
Despite its warm embrace by most jurisdictions, 6 the federal
reliability standard has fomented its own set of problems, chiefly the
criticism that the rule's application has been anything but reliable. The

North Carolina Supreme Court neatly summed up the principle
objections. First, there are fundamental differences between science
and law: "While the law works towards conclusiveness and finality,
science operates on an evolving continuum of probabilities and

likelihoods that, in many instances, is not consonant with the legal
paradigm. 5 8 Second, despite their many talents and gifts, trial judges
are ill-suited to resolve disagreements among experts, particularly
scientific disputes. 9 Third, despite its promised "flexibility" and the
52. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note on 2000 amendments. The Advisory
Committee listed and discussed a number of factors over and beyond those first suggested in
Daubert. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 565).
54. Id. (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)).
55. Id.
56. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4; see also supra text accompanying
note 4.
57. See Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 2004). North Carolina
adheres to a relevancy approach that while similar to Wisconsin's is nonetheless different.
The prime distinctions are that North Carolina does not list "assistance" as a discrete element
and tethers the trial judge's "inherent authority" to limit or exclude expert testimony to that
state's counterpart to section 904.03. See id. at 686.
58. Id. at 690.
59. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court posed the dilemma for trial judges forced to
act as scientific peer reviewers:
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purported lowering of barriers to expert assistance, the federal
reliability rule's application "has been anything but liberal or relaxed"
as trial courts strictly scrutinize expert testimony, especially in products
liability litigation. 6° Finally, "these stringent threshold standards for
admitting expert testimony" have themselves become "case-dispositive"
when used in tandem with pretrial motions for summary judgment.61
The end result may be the "unnecessar[y] encroach[ment] upon the
constitutionally-mandated function of the jury to decide issues of fact
and to assess the weight of the evidence." 62
Critics from within the medical profession have also attacked the
federal rule as itself lacking reliability. A 2002 article in the influential
Journalof the American Medical Association by Kassirer and Cecil took
the federal standard to task because it "yielded inconsistent legal
decisions in otherwise similar medical cases that involve injury from
' 63
putatively toxic substances including drugs (so-called toxic tort cases).

To the authors it seemed that "[t]he courts [were] asserting standards
that they attributed to the medical profession, but that are inconsistent

One of the most troublesome aspects of the Daubert "gatekeeping"
approach is that it places trial courts in the onerous and impractical
position of passing judgment on the substantive merits of the scientific or
technical theories undergirding an expert's opinion. We have great
confidence in the skillfulness of the trial courts of this State. However, we
are unwilling to impose upon them an obligation to expend the human
resources required to delve into complex scientific and technical issues at
the level of understanding necessary to generate with any meaningfulness
the conclusions required under Daubert.
Id. The Howerton court then quoted from the Ninth Circuit opinion that wrestled with the
Daubert litigation following remand by the Supreme Court:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme Court's
opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, well-credentialed
scientists about matters squarely within their expertise, in areas where
there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what is not "good
science," and occasionally to reject such expert testimony because it was
not "derived by the scientific method."
Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995)).
60. Id. at 691 (collecting and quoting authority).
61. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 226-27.
62. Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 692 (citing N.C. Const. art. I, § 25; Brasher v. Sandoz
Pharm. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2001); Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113,
131 (Ariz. 2000); Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 472 (Wyo. 1999)).
63. Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for
Medical Testimony: Disorderin the Courts, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1382, 1382 (2002).
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and sometimes more demanding than actual medical practice." 6 The
result is that seemingly valid claims never reach the trial stage, and

"some physicians now decline in frustration to participate in legal
proceedings.,

65

Although Kassirer and Cecil praise the rule's purported

purpose to "tether[] the standard for admissibility of testimony by
physicians to the professional standards of medical practice," they

conclude that "[c]ourts are misled if they think they are representing
medical practice." 66
Wisconsin has thus far rejected the federal reliability standard
despite strong support for the change. There have been several
unsuccessful legislative attempts to adopt federal Rules 702 and 703.67
The appellate courts have also rejected litigants' pleas to join the federal
line. In State v. Peters, the defendant argued that statistical evidence
regarding DNA testing had been erroneously introduced because it was
unreliable. 68 The court of appeals flatly rejected the argument that
Wisconsin law required a finding of reliability as "a necessary condition
to the admission of scientific evidence," as does Daubert and Frye.69 Put
differently, "the rule remains in Wisconsin that the admissibility of
scientific evidence is not conditioned upon its reliability., 70 Walstad had
rejected the Frye standard and, it followed, that the relevancy rule too
"was unaffected by Daubert.' , 71 Scientific evidence, said the Peters

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1382-83. Kassirer and Cecil, then, echo the criticism that judges are illequipped to resolve scientific disputes. They recommend impartial, independent panels of
experts to assist the court, although most judges would be hard pressed to put aside any such
panel's suggested findings in a given case. See id. at 1387.
67. S.B. 49, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2003) (adopting the 2000 versions of Federal
Rules of Evidence 701-703). Senate Bill 49 was passed by both houses of the Wisconsin
Legislature but was vetoed by Governor James Doyle. S.J. 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. 740 (Wis.
2004) (Governor's veto message regarding veto of S.B. 49). The Governor's carefully crafted
veto message observed that there was "no evidence that Wisconsin's existing rules governing
the admissibility of lay and expert witness testimony has produced unfair or illogical results.
Moreover, under current law, Wisconsin judges already may reject evidence because it is
superfluous, prejudicial, or inherently improbable." Id. Finally, Senate Bill 49 applied only
to civil cases, not to criminal prosecutions or "sexual predator" commitment cases under
Wisconsin Statutes chapter 980. Id. According to the Governor, such a two-track approach
to expert evidence invited "confusion" in the administration of justice. Id. The second failed
legislative effort would have imposed the federal reliability regime on both criminal and civil
trials. See Assemb. B. 278, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
68. 192 Wis. 2d 674, 681, 534 N.W.2d 867, 869-79 (Ct. App. 1995).
69. Id. at 687, 534 N.W.2d at 872.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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court, "is admissible if: (1) it is relevant, § 904.01, STATS.; (2) the witness
is qualified as an expert, § 907.02, STATS.; and (3) the evidence will7

assist the trier of fact in determining an issue of fact, § 907.02.",

Moreover, Peters broadly asserted that "scientific evidence is admissible

under the relevancy test regardless of the scientific principle that
underlies the evidence.,

73

In support of this proposition, the Peters

court relied on the passage from Walstad (quoted above) that framed
the issues as ones of qualifications and "credibility" which were
sufficiently safeguarded by wide-open cross-examination and
impeachment. Finally, as we will see in the next Part, the Peters court

emphasized the discretionary role of the trial judge as a "limited
gatekeeper" empowered to exclude any evidence, including expert
testimony, that is superfluous, unduly confusing, or a waste of time.
In State v. Davis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied upon Peters in

restating its confidence in the relevancy test:
[I]n Wisconsin, the reliability of expert testimony is an
issue for the trier of fact, not the circuit court as a
predicate

for

admissibility.

Reliability

of expert

testimony is something that is subject to challenge on
cross-examination in Wisconsin. The trier of fact must
then determine the reliability of such evidence in light of
differing opinions by experts. For this reason, we leave

any determination on reliability of such evidence to the
trier of fact.74

The court was unperturbed by grim warnings about trials featuring 75
a
"battle of experts," as this frequently occurred in trials regardless.

72. Id. at 687-88, 534 N.W.2d at 872 (footnotes omitted) (citing State v. Walstad, 119
Wis. 2d 483, 516, 351 N.W.2d 469, 486 (1984)).
73. Id. at 688, 534 N.W.2d at 872 (emphasis added).
74. State v. Davis, 2002 WI 75, 22, 254 Wis. 2d 1, 22, 645 N.W.2d 913, T 22 (citations
omitted). The Wisconsin Supreme Court also rejected overtures to adopt the federal
reliability standard in Conley Publishing v. Journal Communications. 2003 WI 119, 35, 265
Wis. 2d 128,
35, 665 N.W.2d 879,
35 ("Whatever merit there may be in revisiting
Wisconsin law on the admissibility of expert testimony in light of Daubert,we do not believe
that this case presents the proper vehicle. The Daubert standard governs the admissibility of
expert opinions and deals with the threshold reliability of an expert's opinion. In the present
action, the parties do not dispute the qualifications of any experts or the relevancy of their
testimony. Because the admissibility of an expert's opinion was not challenged in this appeal,
the Daubertissue is not sufficiently present to require a decision.").
75. Davis, 2002 WI 75, T 20, 254 Wis. 2d 1, 20, 645 N.W.2d 913, 20. In Davis, the
defense used expert opinion evidence to prove his character. Id. T 16, 254 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 645
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Davis, then, manifests not just the supreme court's rejection of Daubert,
Frye, and a finding of reliability as a predicate for admissibility, but also
the court's continuing faith in the adversary trial process, the skill of
trial lawyers to expose weaknesses through cross-examination and
impeachment, and the capacity of lay juries to comprehend expert
testimony. Yet it is not a blind faith rule nor is the rule without defined
limits.
III. CONDITIONAL RELEVANCY AND THE AUTHENTICATION OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY

Although reliability is a matter of weight for the trier of fact, there
are meaningful restrictions on expert testimony. Most obvious are the
core elements of the relevancy test itself (relevancy, qualifications, and
assistance) and the limited gatekeeping function, discussed below. Less
obvious but as important is the predicate of authentication, which is
implied in the supreme court's admonition that "scientific expert
testimony must be 'reliable enough to be probative.' ' 76 Succinctly
stated, the proponent must introduce sufficient evidence to support a
finding that "the matter in question is what its proponent claims., 77 In
the parlance of expert testimony, the proponent must provide sufficient
evidence that the witness's methods, principles, and reasoning produce
reliable results or conclusions. 8 Although the jury ultimately decides
the "weight" of the evidence, the judge ensures there is sufficient
probative value (or "heft," if you will) to justify submitting the issue in
the first instance.
Modern trial procedures subject all evidence to "gatekeeping" by
the trial judge. There are two different gates. Section 901.04(1) governs
preliminary questions of admissibility, where the trial judge decides all

N.W.2d 913, T 16. See WIS. STAT. § 904.04(1) (2003-2004). The court was "unpersuaded" by
the State's argument that each side might present opposing experts, as "a battle between
experts is a frequent occurrence in criminal cases where specialized knowledge on a relevant
issue is required." Davis, 2002 WI 75, 20, 254 Wis. 2d 1, 20, 645 N.W.2d 913, 20. See
BLINKA, supra note 28, § 405.2 (supplement).
76. State v. Hibl, 2006 WI 52, 52, 290 Wis. 2d 595, T 52, 714 N.W.2d 194, 52. The
Hibl court quoted from State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 519, 351 N.W.2d 469, 487 (1984),
which in turn quoted a Louisiana case, State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 979 (La. 1979).
Louisiana has since elected to follow the Daubert rule. See State v. Chauvin, 2002-1188 (La.
5/20/03), 846 So. 2d 697.
77. WIS. STAT. § 909.01 (2003-2004).
78. WIS. STAT. § 909.015(9) (2003-2004). See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE:
TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 263-64 (5th ed. 2002).
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For example, whether evidence constitutes

hearsay or falls within a hearsay exception are issues solely for the judge
to determine. More pertinent, "the qualifications of a person to be a
witness," lay or expert, is specifically assigned to the judge as a
preliminary question of admissibility. Only when the judge is convinced
that all issues of fact and law are established by a preponderance of the

evidence is the testimony or exhibit admitted into evidence., ° The jury,
then, plays no role in admissibility. The federal courts funnel the
Daubertreliability determination through this gate."

Other issues are said to run to the "weight" of the evidence, such as
the credibility of witnesses. Yet even "weight" determinations are
subject to scrutiny through the gate of conditional relevancy. Section
901.04(2) provides:

(2) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy
of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition
of fact, the judge shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of

the fulfillment of the conditioni8
Here, the responsibility is shared by judge and jury-unlike section
901.04(1), where the judge decides all issues of fact and law. The judge

first determines whether there is sufficient evidence from which a jury,
acting reasonably, could find the predicate fact upon which the
relevancy of the evidence depends. It is then up to the jury to so decide.
To take a simple example, section 906.02 imposes a personal knowledge
requirement on lay witnesses that is governed by conditional relevancy.

Their testimony is predicated upon a sufficient showing of firsthand

79. Preliminary questions of admissibility are subject to the preponderance of the
evidence standard. See GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 7.02[B], at 89; BLINKA, supra note 28, §
104.1. See also WIS. STAT. § 909.01 (2003-2004) judicial council committee's note; accord
Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R330-R331 (1973) (discussing the distinction between
conditional relevancy and preliminary questions of admissibility).
80. See WIS. STAT. § 901.04(5) (2003-2004) ("This section does not limit the right of a
party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility."), accord FED. R.
EVID. 104(e). For example, the judge might admit hearsay as an excited utterance-the judge
being satisfied that all elements of the exception have been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence-but the jury decides what weight, if any to give the evidence (e.g., was the
declarant mistaken or lying?).
81. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993). See also FED.
R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
82. WtS. STAT. § 901.04(2) (2003-2004).
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knowledge: Could a reasonable jury find that the witness personally
observed the event? Thus, a witness's testimony that "I saw A strike B"
is usually a sufficient predicate; whether the witness is lying or mistaken
is for the jury.83 Yet, if the same witness asserts that she was fifty miles
away at that very moment she perceived A strike B, a judge would
of
undoubtedly find this insufficient. While credibility is the archetype
84

weight issues, no reasonable jury could believe her testimony.
To take a final example, often times evidence triggers some issues
for the judge alone under section 901.04(1) as well as others involving
conditional relevancy under section 901.04(2). Suppose a defendant
insurer suspects that the plaintiff is feigning his injuries. At trial the
insurer calls a witness who testifies that she received a phone call from

the plaintiff, who said he was faking injuries in order to get more money
from the insurer.

A hearsay objection, followed by the proponent's

response that the statement is an admission by a party opponent, raises
preliminary questions of admissibility (fact and law) that the judge alone
decides. 85 And the additional objection that the plaintiff never made the

call (the witness is lying or an impersonator mimicked plaintiff's voice)
raises the issue of authentication: Is there sufficient proof that the
plaintiff "in fact" made the call?
Authentication, thus, is a special case of conditional relevancy.

Section 909.01 sets forth the general rule of authentication in language
that essentially restates section 901.04(2):

83. See WIS. STAT. § 906.02 (2003-2004), which states:
906.02 Lack of personal knowledge. A witness may not testify to a matter
unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the
witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove
personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the
witness. This rule is subject to the provisions of s. 907.03 relating to
opinion testimony by expert witnesses.
Note that section 906.02 specifically incorporates the conditional relevancy standard of
section 901.04(2).
84. The personal knowledge requirement generally assumes a person has ordinary or
typical powers of perception and memory. See BLINKA, supra note 28, § 602.1. Perception
itself is confined to the five senses. Thus, the little boy in the movie The Sixth Sense would
never be permitted to testify "I see dead people," except perhaps on cross-examination to
impeach his credibility (a "defect" in his mental capacity). See GIANNELLI, supra note 8, §
22.05, at 266; BLINKA, supra note 28, §§ 602.1, 607.4.
85. WIS. STAT. § 908.01(4)(b)(1) (2003-2004). The judge decides all issues of fact and
law, including whether it is more likely than not that the plaintiff made the call. Assuming the
judge so finds, the jury will not be informed of the judge's admissibility decisions.
GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 32.10[D], at 464.
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909.01 General provision. The requirements of
authentication or identification as a condition precedent
to admissibility are satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims.86
"Illustrations" of common authentication scenarios are provided in
section 909.015, which includes subsection (9):
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or
and showing
result
system used to produce a an
a the
result.8 that
accurate
process or system produces
Absent judicial notice, the predicate showing usually must be provided
Section
by a witness with specialized knowledge (an expert).'
909.015(9) literally illustrates that the expert's specialized knowledge,
whether it consists of theories, principles, methods, tests, or reasoning
borne of just plain "specialized" experience, must satisfy the modest
requirement of conditional relevancy. To take another easy example,
were counsel desperate (or daft) enough to call a necromancer (one who
purportedly communicates with the dead) as a witness, the trial judge
would have little difficulty excluding the testimony on grounds that no
89
jury, acting reasonably, could find such testimony reliable or accurate.
A more realistic, troublesome scenario involves so-called ipse dixit
("he himself said it") testimony by experts who are unwilling or unable
to explain the reasoning or methodology underlying their opinions.'
Conceding that experts have wide latitude in, and varying aptitudes for,

86. WIS. STAT. § 909.01 (2003-2004).
87. The Wisconsin rules tracked the original federal rules in offering section 909.015 as a
set of "illustrations" rather than "rules." See FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee's note.
88. See, e.g., 4 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 901:9
(6th ed. 2006) (collecting cases). See also CARLSON ET AL., supra note 78.
89. The Supreme Court mentioned necromancy and astrology to illustrate the
shortcomings of any test that considers only "general acceptance." Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999). In short, the community of astrologists and
necromancers may have generally accepted beliefs and practices, but "the discipline itself
lacks reliability." Id.
90. Id. at 157 ("Of course, [the expert] himself claimed that his method was accurate,
but ... 'nothing in either Daubertor the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert."'
(citation omitted)).
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explaining their opinions, there does reach a point when "it's tough to
explain, but .. ." becomes little more than "trust me, I'm right." Trial

judges must be accorded great deference in determining whether the
expert's testimony offers a sufficient basis from which a reasonable jury
could find the opinion testimony, and its underlying explanation,
reliable. 9' And in some cases an inability to articulate the underlying
rationale may be grounds for ruling that the conditional relevancy

standard has not been satisfied.
The authentication standard does not demand the intricate, complex

"pavane" that Daubert seemingly entails.'
The federal reliability
approach compels the judge to make two sets of findings: first, what

"factors" comprise the criteria for determining reliability? Second, are
the expert's methodology and theories reliable under those criteria?93 A
conditional relevancy approach to reliability is fundamentally different
because the judge need only determine whether there is sufficient

evidence to support a reasoned decision by the jury. The judge, then, is
not expected to mediate scientific disputes on the merits but rather to
determine only whether the issues may be fairly disputed within the
framework of the adversary trial. The "indices of reliability" will be
necessarily case-specific.94 On appellate review, judges will find an
91. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note, which, in addressing this problem,
observed that the federal "trial court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply
'taking the expert's word for it."' The same holds even under the conditional relevancy
standard of scrutiny.
92. See Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 690 (N.C. 2004) (quoting RuizTroche v. Pepsi-Cola., 161 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[Clhoreographing the Daubert pavane
remains an exceedingly difficult task")). A "pavane" is defined as a "stately court dance" of
early modern Europe.

MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 909 (11th ed.

2003).
93. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, reliability of the methods and tests are
preliminary questions for the judge, who decides all issues of fact and law by a preponderance
of the evidence. The rule compels the federal gatekeeper to first erect the gate, that is, to
determine what factors (peer review, etc.) establish the criteria for reliability in a given case
and then decide whether the expert's methods, and their application, are in conformity. See
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note on the 2000 amendments ("[T]he admissibility
of all expert testimony is governed by the principles of Rule 104(a)," including the
responsibility of identifying "factors relevant in determining whether expert testimony is
sufficiently reliable."). See also GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 24.04[E] (discussing "Daubert
factors"). Thoughtful critics have argued that the federal courts' reliability determinations
are themselves inconsistent, conflicting, and thus unreliable. See, e.g., Kassirer & Cecil, supra
note 63.
94. See Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 687 (finding that in cases where legal precedent
provides no guidance, "the trial court should generally focus on the following nonexclusive
'indices of reliability' to determine whether the expert's proffered scientific or technical
method of proof is sufficiently reliable: 'the expert's use of established techniques, the
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abuse of discretion only when no reasonable jury could have relied on
One might argue that the conditional
the expert's testimony.9 5
relevancy approach sacrifices precision in decision making, but
that Rule 702's promise of precision has
Daubert's critics will counter
96
not been kept in any event.
In sum, the reliability of an expert's theories, methods, and tests, as
well as their application to the facts, are governed by the conditional
relevancy standard. This conclusion follows from the rules of evidence,
where it is explicitly set forth, and is implicit in the case law, particularly
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's admonition that "scientific expert
testimony must be 'reliable enough to be probative."' 97 Finally, it is also
fully consistent with, if not inherent in, both the general relevancy test
itself and the limited gatekeeping function to which we now turn. 98
IV. THE LIMITED GATEKEEPING FUNCTION

The limited gatekeeping function, first labeled as such in Peters, was
hardly a novel gloss on the relevancy test, which had never been a rule
of free proof. McCormick, an early, ardent supporter, framed the
relevancy test as one in which probative value must be balanced against
countervailing reasons for exclusion:
Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a
qualified expert witness should be received unless there
Particularly, its
are other reasons for exclusion.
probative value may be overborne by the familiar
dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury, unfair
surprise and undue consumption of time. 9
expert's professional background in the field, the use of visual aids before the jury so that the
jury is not asked to sacrifice its independence by accepting [the] scientific hypotheses on faith,
and independent research conducted by the expert."' (internal quotations omitted) (citing
authority)).
95. Although it is far too early to predict developments with any certainty, this approach
may encourage appellate courts (and lawyers) to identify boundaries in the case law, as has
occurred with respect to polygraphs and expert testimony on mental capacity to form criminal
intent, neither of which is admissible. See infra text accompanying notes 134-38.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 56-66.
97. State v. Hibl, 2006 WI 52, 52, 290 Wis. 2d 595, 52, 714 N.W.2d 194, 1 52 (citations
omitted).
98. Authentication of the expert's methods, tests, and principles, it is contended, should
be examined when considering the relevancy element. See infra text accompanying notes
157-70.
99. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 363-64 (1954),
quoted in Giannelli, supranote 30, at 1233.

2006]

EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE RELEVANCY RULE

197

More recently, influential evidence scholars such as Giannelli have
concurred that the relevancy test, while a liberal admissibility standard,
empowers trial judges to limit expert evidence. The probative value of
the expert's testimony must be balanced against the risks associated with
misleading the jury, confusion, and undue prejudice, which in turn are
now rooted in federal Rule 401(relevancy) and Rule 403 (the balancing

test)."° (The corresponding Wisconsin rules of evidence are identical.)
Wisconsin authority also anticipated the Peters limited gatekeeping

function. At about the same time as the creation of the Wisconsin Rules
of Evidence in 1974, case law relied upon McCormick's formulation of
the relevancy test, especially the admonition that the probative value of

expert testimony must be weighed against "the familiar dangers of
prejudicing or misleading the jury, and undue consumption of time.''°
The Judicial Council's note to section 907.02, as we have seen,
supported the assistance standard yet accorded the trial judge discretion

to exclude evidence with little or no probative value."° And in clarifying
that Frye was anathema to the relevancy test, Walstad explicitly invoked
the Judicial Council Committee's limits:
As the commentary to Rule 907.02 points out, under
Rule 907.02, expert testimony is admissible if relevant

100. Giannelli, supra note 30, at 1235. See also GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 4, § 1-6, at 31-33 (discussing the relevancy test in terms of Federal Rules of Evidence
401 and 403 and summarizing it as a three-step test: "first, ascertaining the probative value of
the evidence; second, identifying any countervailing dangers or considerations; and third,
balancing the probative value against the identified dangers or considerations"). In the
discussions that follow, it is contended that the relevancy test, as construed by the courts, is
not restricted to section 904.01 through section 904.03 (the Wisconsin equivalents to the
corresponding federal rules). In particular, section 907.02 permits a judge to exclude expert
testimony if it is, for example, superfluous or a waste of time, and even when the
countervailing considerations are evenly balanced against probative value.
101. Watson v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 264, 273, 219 N.W.2d 398, 403 (1974) (quoting EDWARD
W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON EVIDENCE § 203 (2d ed.
1972). It should be observed that the quote from MCCORMICK's second edition is nearly
identical to the corresponding passage in the first edition, quoted in the text accompanying
note 99, with the notable exception of the deletion of "unfair surprise."
102. WIS. STAT. § 907.02 (2003-2004) judicial council committee's note ("With such a
test expert testimony will usually be admissible and will only be excluded if superfluous and a
waste of time." (citing Wisconsin case law)); accord Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R207
(1973).
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and will be excluded3 only if the testimony is superfluous
or a waste of time.
What is critical here, and easy enough to overlook, is that the Walstad
court referenced only section 907.02, not the balancing test in section
904.03, which excludes evidence only if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or other dangers. It seems
then that section 907.02 confers broader power on the court to exclude,
limit, or modify expert testimony than does section 904.03. Before
considering this point more closely, it is appropriate to first discuss
Peters' explication of the limited gatekeeping function.
The Peters court, as we have seen, confirmed Wisconsin's continuing
adherence to the relevancy test and rejected Daubert's construction of
the parallel, and identical, Federal Rules of Evidence."' The reliability
of an expert's principles, methods, or tests was not a predicate to
admissibility; rather, it was a function of his or her credibility, an issue of
weight left to the trier of fact.1 °5 To underscore its point, Peters
proclaimed that "scientific evidence is admissible under the relevancy
test regardless of the scientific principle that underlies the evidence.""
Yet anyone who thought that the relevancy test opened the courtroom's
doors to necromancers as well as neurologists was plainly mistaken
because "Wisconsin judges do serve a limited and indirect gatekeeping
role in reviewing the admissibility of scientific evidence.""1 7
And how do judges fulfill the role of limited gatekeeper? In
contrasting the federal rule, the Peters court explained only that the
''role is much more oblique and does not involve a direct determination
as to the reliability of the scientific principle on which the evidence is
based."' '° It then offered six illustrations in which "Wisconsin judges
103. State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 516, 351 N.W.2d 469, 486 (1984). Although the
supreme court did not explicitly cite the committee's note, the quoted language and context
leaves little reasonable doubt that it is from the Judicial Council Committee's note to section
907.02, quoted above, supra note 102.
104. See State v. Peters, 192 Wis. 2d 674, 534 N.W.2d 867 (Ct. App. 1995). Peters was
decided in 1995, before the federal rules were amended to reflect the holdings in Daubertand
the later Kumho Tire case. In 1995, then, Wisconsin's pertinent rules of evidence were
identical to the corresponding federal rules. Compare WIS. STAT. § 907.02, with FED. R.
EVID. 702 as discussed in Daubert v. Merrel Dew Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587-88
(1993).
105. Peters,192 Wis. 2d at 685-92, 534 N.W.2d at 871-75.
106. Id. at 688, 534 N.W.2d at 872.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 689, 534 N.W.2d at 872-73.

2006]

EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE RELEVANCY RULE

199

may reject relevant evidence," noting that the "list is not an exhaustive
inventory of those grounds upon which the trial court may rely in
refusing to admit relevant evidence."' 9
We will consider each
illustration in turn, although they are not mutually exclusive and overlap
to a considerable extent both with one another and the core elements of
the relevancy test-qualifications, assistance, and relevancy.
First, expert testimony may be excluded if it is "superfluous."" 0 The
term is undefined, although the cases and commentary on the relevancy
rule invariably list it among the chief limiting factors."1 The dictionary
defines "superfluous" as "unnecessary, esp[ecially] through being more
than enough." 2 And the phrase "more than enough" is truly the
operative language, as the assistance standard of section 907.02
eschewed the common law's necessity test in favor of one open and
inviting to specialized knowledge that may help the trier of fact. Since
the assistance standard is generous and because almost any qualified
expert may assist the trier in better understanding the facts, the issue is
how much courtroom education will the testimony provide, to what
degree will it assist the trier of fact, and for what purposes will the
testimony be admitted? Thus, in a routine personal injury case the trial
judge will likely not suffer an expert's explanation of the engineering
principles that underlie the internal combustion engine except as it
might bear on the disputed issues (e.g., stopping distance).
Undoubtedly, the trier of fact could learn things it did not know before,
but the education may be "more than enough.""..3
Closely related is the second factor: "waste of judicial time and
resources."11 4 Earlier commentary and cases had paired "waste of time"
with "superfluous,' ' 5 but the Peters formulation tellingly emphasized
the drain on "judicial time and resources." 116 Even if one concedes that
an expert's testimony may assist the trier of fact, is it worth spending
109. Id. at 689-90, 534 N.W.2d at 873.
110. Id. at 689,534 N.W.2d at 873.
111. See id. (citing State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 516, 351 N.W.2d 469,486 (1984)).
112. THE OXFORD AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1384 (2002).
113. One may also be tempted to object that such testimony is irrelevant, but the
extraordinarily broad definition of relevancy in section 904.01 encompasses all evidence that
has "any tendency," no matter how slight, to make a consequential proposition more or less
likely. See Wis. STAT. § 904.01 (2003-2004). In short, the issue here is whether even relevant
evidence is superfluous and subject to exclusion without resort to the weighted balancing test
of section 904.03.
114. Peters, 192 Wis. 2d at 689, 534 N.W.2d at 873.
115. See, e.g., Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d at 516, 351 N.W.2d at 487 (1984).
116. Peters, 192 Wis. 2d at 689, 534 N.W.2d at 873.
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hours of trial time in direct examination and cross-examination,
especially if opposing counsel may feel compelled to present its own
expert to contradict the first? In short, expert assistance carries real
costs that the trial judge must calculate. The decision is, of course,
discretionary. 117
Third, the Peters court observed that section 904.03 may constitute
an additional ground for excluding evidence, particularly when the
evidence is prejudicial."' The court did not elaborate on the interplay
between sections 904.03 and 907.02, but it seems likely that its point was
to emphasize the prejudice factor." 9 And by listing section 904.03 as a

third, and separate, factor, Peters confirmed that section 907.02 carries
its own balancing test of sorts: one that gives the trial judge far greater
latitude to exclude relevant, even helpful evidence than does section

904.03, a point considered in greater detail below.
Fourth, the judge may exclude an expert's testimony where "the jury
is able to draw its own conclusions without it."' 20 Peters cited without
discussion Valiga v. National Food Co.,1 2' a lawsuit brought by mink
ranchers for damages caused by contaminated mink food. In Valiga, the
trial court excluded expert testimony on the issue of damages by a
defense expert, a certified public accountant (CPA), who the court
found unqualified to testify about the value of mink. 22 Although the
CPA held certain other opinions, they were founded upon tax returns

and other documents that had been received into evidence.'" For this
reason, the judge also ruled that the jury could determine these facts
1
without the CPA's testimony."

The supreme court affirmed.'

117. The phrase "waste of time" also appears in section 904.03, but Peters, Walstad, and
other formulations of the relevancy test pair "waste of time" with "superfluous" entirely apart
from section 904.03. See id. at 689, 534 N.W.2d at 873; Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d at 516, 351
N.W.2d at 487. In short, neither "superfluous" nor "waste of time" are governed by the
weighted balancing test of section 904.03.
118. Peters,192 Wis. 2d at 689, 534 N.W.2d at 873.
119. The court described the third factor as follows: "the probative value of the evidence
is outweighed by its prejudice to the defendant." Id. This description, even as a shorthand, is
inaccurate in two respects. First, section 904.03 uses the phrase "unfair prejudice," not simple
prejudice. See BLINKA, supra note 28, § 403.1. Second, the probative value must be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice (or such) before the judge may
exclude it in her discretion. Id.
120. Peters, 192 Wis. 2d at 689, 534 N.W.2d at 873.
121. 58 Wis. 2d 232, 206 N.W.2d 377 (1973).
122 Id. at 251, 206 N.W.2d at 387-88.
123. Id. at 252, 206 N.W.2d at 388.
124. Id. at 251, 206 N.W.2d at 387.
125. Id. at 260, 206 N.W.2d at 392.
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Emphasizing the discretionary nature of these rulings, the supreme
court also strongly implied that the jury could draw its own conclusions,
especially because the CPA relied solely on income tax returns. The
true measure of damages, it observed, was the "fair market value of the
mink and not the plaintiffs' net profit or loss for a given year.' ' 16 Valiga,
then, illustrates the broad discretion granted to trial judges to determine
whether an expert may assist a jury in light of his qualifications, the
nature of the issue to be resolved, and the underlying evidence relied
upon by the expert.
Fifth, the judge may consider whether "the evidence is inherently
improbable," a factor that presents perhaps the sternest test for when
reliability may be safely left to a lay trier of fact.'27 Again without
elaboration, the Peters court cited a divorce case, Peterson v. Peterson,
which also involved an accountant. 128 The alleged error in Peterson
involved the trial judge's determination that the husband's retirement
plan had no value. 29 Although the wife offered the accountant's
opinion that the retirement plan had a value exceeding $10,000, the trial
judge rejected the opinion because it rested upon too many unwarranted
assumptions.1 30 The court of appeals affirmed. The trial court had
properly exercised its discretion "in concluding that the accountant's
testimony as to valuation was speculative and improbable."''
At first
look, Peterson seems inapt as an illustration, especially because the issue
concerned a finding of fact, not the admissibility of evidence, and mostly
concerned inadequacies in reasoning and factual bases. Case law long
recognized that "[a] court is not obliged to adopt even uncontradicted
testimony if it is inherently improbable or if there is other evidence in
the case that renders it against reasonable probabilities."'' 32 Yet, the
telling point is that a judge need not uncritically accept testimony that
he or she believes is unsupported by evidence or that is speculative and
improbable. And while Petersoninvolved a family court bench trial and
a fact finding, the Peters case extended the principle to the admissibility
of expert testimony in civil and criminal cases generally. Reliability of
an expert's principles, methods, or tests may be safely left to the jury
126.
127.
128.
1985)).
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 252, 206 N.W.2d at 388.
State v. Peters, 192 Wis. 2d 674, 689, 534 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Ct. App. 1995).
Id. (citing Peterson v. Peterson, 126 Wis. 2d 264, 266, 376 N.W.2d 88, 89 (Ct. App.
Peterson, 126 Wis.
Id., 376 N.W.2d at
Id., 376 N.W.2d at
Id., 376 N.W.2d at

2d at 266, 376 N.W.2d at 89.
89.
89.
89.
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where they are reasonably disputed, but where the judge is satisfied that
the expert's reasoning or bases are "speculative and improbable," the

judge need not stand helplessly by while such pap is spread before the
jury. Peterson, then, in effect represents an application of conditional
relevancy and the principle that the expert's methodology must be
authenticated. 133
Sixth, where public policy has declared that an "area of testimony is

not suitable for expert opinion," the judge must, of course, so abide.'34
Although content to list the first five factors along with terse citations,
the Peters court labored to reconcile this "unsuitable for expertise"
factor with its holding that reliability is ordinarily left to weight and
credibility. Case law has declared several areas of erstwhile-specialized
knowledge unreliable as a matter of law. In State v. Flattum, the

Wisconsin Supreme Court held that during the guilt phase of a criminal
trial "psychiatric testimony regarding a defendant's capacity to form
intent is inadmissible for lack of reliability."1 35 The Flattum holding built
in turn upon earlier cases, especially Steele v. State, which concluded that
"the state of psychiatric science was not sufficiently advanced" to
determine the defendant's ability to consciously form a criminal
purpose.'36 And case law also declared polygraph evidence inadmissible
because it was insufficiently reliable. 13' Neither line of cases, however,
undercut the essential rationale of the relevancy rule, which was to
avoid the "type of ad hoc reliability determination envisioned" by
Daubert and the federal rule.'38 In short, such lines of cases were likely
to be few and embodied reasoned public policy determinations by
appellate courts in published opinions. Adhering to case law precedent
presented none of the vices or difficulties of trial judges struggling to

133. See supra text accompanying notes 86-96.
134. State v. Peters, 192 Wis. 2d 674, 689, 534 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing
State v. Flattum, 122 Wis. 2d 282, 289-90, 361 N.W.2d 705, 709-10 (1985)).
135. Id. at 689 n.8, 534 N.W.2d at 873 n.8. (citing Flattum, 122 Wis. 2d at 289-90, 361
N.W.2d at 709-10).
136. Id., 534 N.W.2d at 873 n.8 (discussing Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2
(1980)). The Flattum court further observed that "[p]erhaps the most fundamental problem
with the admission of psychiatric opinion evidence on the question of the defendant's capacity
to form the requisite intent when that opinion is based on the defendant's mental health
history is the inconsistency between the law's conception of intent and the psychiatric
community's understanding of the term." Flattum, 122 Wis. 2d at 291, 361 N.W.2d at 710.
137. See Peters, 192 Wis. 2d at 689 n.8, 534 N.W.2d at 873 n.8 (discussing State v. Dean,
103 Wis. 2d 228, 279, 307 N.W.2d 628, 653 (1981)).
138. Id. at 689 n.8, 534 N.W.2d at 873 n.8.
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determine the reliability of some expert's methods on a case-by-case
basis.
V. LIMITED GATEKEEPING IN PERSPECTIVE
Peters, then, signaled several important developments in the law
governing expert evidence. First, the relevancy test had limits that were
to be taken seriously. While accommodating expert assistance, section
907.02 did not open the evidentiary spillways to anything and everything

creative lawyers deem helpful to their positions. "[T]hrough their
limited gatekeeping functions," trial judges "may restrict the

admissibility" of expert testimony. " 9 Moreover, the judges' decisions
were discretionary and would not be overturned on appeal absent an
abuse of that discretion."
Second, Peters presented a wide array of factors that judges may
consider when deciding whether to restrict expert testimony. The six
factors discussed above were, the court said, only illustrative and not an
"exhaustive inventory."'41 As a whole, if not individually, these factors
conferred far-reaching power that went well beyond section 904.03 (the
third Peters ground). Under section 904.03, the judge may exclude,
restrict, or even remold evidence, but only where the judge finds that its
probative value is substantially outweighed by other considerations or
dangers, such as unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Yet
Peters also recognized that section 907.02 carries its own weighing test of
sorts that permits far greater flexibility than section 904.03. Under
section 907.02 a trial judge may restrict or exclude expert testimony
whenever it appears that its probative value is offset by, or perhaps
evenly arrayed against, objections that it is superfluous or a waste of
time. 142 The broader discretion is essential because of the extraordinary
problems presented by the expert testimony, which is nearly always
139. Id. at 690, 534 N.W.2d at 873.
140. Id. at 685, 534 N.W.2d at 871.
141. Id. at 690, 534 N.W.2d at 873.
142. McCormick's 1954 formulation of the relevancy test asks whether the probative
value of the evidence is "overborne" by other risks, such as prejudice or misleading the jury.
See GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 24.04[B], at 314 n.51 (quoting MCCORMICK, supra note 99, §
171, at 363-64). Some case law presents the issue as turning on a finding that the evidence is
superfluous or a waste of time irrespective of any balancing test. See, e.g., State v. Walstad,
119 Wis. 2d 483, 516, 351 N.W.2d 469, 486 (1984) ("[E]xpert testimony is admissible if
relevant and will be excluded only if the testimony is superfluous or a waste of time."). See
also WIS. STAT. § 907.02 (2003-2004) judicial council committee's note; accord Sup. Ct.
Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R207 (1973). In any event, the trial judge has discretion in making the
ruling, so the distinction is probably of little moment.
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exclude both lay and expert testimony on eyewitness identification. 4

Conceding that juries are usually able to evaluate eyewitness
identification without expert assistance, the court nonetheless implied
that there are some circumstances in which a jury might profit from an
expert's specialized knowledge.'

6

In light of their multiplicity and

complexity, it declined to offer an "inflexible list of factors" and
entrusted the matter to "litigants and trial courts."14' 7 And although Hibi
references only section 904.03, and not Peters, in its brief discussion of

the trial court's broad discretion, the supreme court's admonition that
"scientific expert testimony must be 'reliable enough to be probative'' is
at once consistent with 48Peters and the framing of reliability as an issue of
conditional relevancy.

Thus, the limited gatekeeping function is firmly ensconced in
Wisconsin's evolving relevancy rule. And it is against this backdrop that

we now consider the core elements of the relevancy test.
VI. THE RELEVANCY TEST RECONSIDERED

The limited gatekeeping function backlights the relevancy standard,

bringing into sharper focus its elements of relevance, qualifications, and
assistance. The ordering of these elements is important. Relevance
itself is the threshold. The witness's qualifications will in turn determine

how much assistance, if any, this witness's testimony may provide the
jury and the form it might take. Limited gatekeeping is primarily
involved in evaluating the functional link between qualifications and
assistance. We will consider each element in turn while keeping in mind
that conditional relevancy governs the reliability of the expert's theories,
tests, and methods, as well as their application.

145. 2006 WI 52, 1 52, 290 Wis. 2d 595,T 52,714 N.W.2d 194, T 52.
146. Id. 1 53, 290 Wis. 2d 595, 53, 714 N.W.2d 194, 53.
147. Id. 54, 290 Wis. 2d 595, 54, 714 N.W.2d 194, 1 54 (referencing paragraph 40 of
the opinion, in which the court discussed "phenomena" outside lay "common knowledge"
that may in turn justify either the use of expert testimony to assist the jury or the exclusion of
lay identification testimony all together). See State v. Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, 17, 288 Wis. 2d
1, 9117, 709 N.W.2d 370, 17 (suggesting that trial courts are, or should be, more receptive to
expert testimony on "factors that influence identification and memory").
148. Hibl, 2006 WI 52, 9 52, 290 Wis. 2d 595, 52, 714 N.W.2d 194, 1 52 (referring to
language in State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 519 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984)). At oral argument
the parties agreed that section 904.03 had a "role to play in the context of the reliability of
eyewitness identification evidence." Id. 9151, 290 Wis. 2d 595, 9151, 714 N.W.2d 194, 1 51.
There was scant opportunity for the court to distinguish the application of the limited
gatekeeping function in the "context" of lay versus expert testimony.
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A. Is the Testimony Relevant?

Relevancy is, in the truest sense, the prime element of the test that
carries its name. This is noteworthy only because relevance is often
swallowed by the focus on qualifications, assistance, and limited
gatekeeping. McCormick's original definition declared that "[a]ny
relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness
should be received" into evidence.'49 Although relevancy is expansively
defined under present rules, the concept is not without bounds and
provides the court with the means to regulate expert testimony.
Relevancy is defined by section 904.01, which provides:
904.01 Definition of "relevant evidence". "Relevant
evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.150
The definition of relevancy "has two facets.''. First, the evidence must
relate "to a fact or proposition that is of consequence to the
determination of the action."' 52 Consequential propositions are
determined with reference to the parties' pleadings and the substantive
law; put differently, they are a function of the claims and defenses
asserted by the parties in the complaint, the answer, and other
responsive pleadings, which in turn are grounded in the law of torts,
contract, property, etc. 5 3 Second, the evidence must have "a tendency
to make a consequential fact more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."'' 4 The tendency may be found in
common sense and everyday experience; it is not simply an exercise in
logic (deductive or inductive) nor one confined to case law. Most often,
the judge's own education, experience, and intuition furnishes the
standard, although counsel may play a critical role in articulating his or
her theory of admissibility.'55 Relevancy, then, is a preliminary question

149. See MCCORMICK, supra note 99, § 171, at 363-64.
150. WIS. STAT. § 904.01 (2003-2004).

151.
152.
153.
154.

State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 785,576 N.W.2d 30, 38 (1998).
Id.
Id. See BLINKA, supra note 28, § 401.101 (collecting authority).
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 786, 576 N.W.2d at 39.
155. BLINKA, supranote 28, § 401.102 (collecting authority).
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of admissibility for the trial judge, whose decision will stand on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion."'
Although experts may assist the judge in determining relevancy, the
ultimate decision rests with the judge because the expert's reasoning or
methods may conflict with core legal standards or values. "7 As
previously discussed, the Flattum-Steele line of cases holds inadmissible
any testimony by psychologists or psychiatrists regarding a person's
capacity to form criminal intent during the guilt phase of a trial. They
embody the finding that many mental health professionals harbor
conceptions of the mind and human behavior that are so radically
different from those in the
law that their testimony cannot provide
158
evidence.
helpful
relevant,
Nor are concerns about relevance confined to an expert's opinions
and conclusions; rather, they may extend to the expert's methodology,
reasoning, and underlying bases, as illustrated by Bittner v. American
Honda Motor Co. 159 Bittner was seriously injured when his Honda
three-wheel ATV overturned.""
No one witnessed the accident.
Plaintiffs sued Honda for strict products liability and negligence,
contending that the ATV was defective, unreasonably dangerous, and
that Honda was negligent in its design and sale. 6' A jury found in favor
of Honda. The supreme court reversed because Honda had heavily
relied upon expert testimony that compared the risk from injury in
operating a Honda ATV with myriad other activities.'62 During three
days of testimony, Honda's expert, Roger McCarthy, "compared the
risk of injury associated with ATVs to products and activities such as
bicycle riding, water skiing, roller skating, scuba diving, and driving
various automobiles."' 163
Among many proffered purposes, Honda
asserted that McCarthy's fascinating testimony "demonstrate[d] that
ATV riding is not disproportionately dangerous when compared to
156. See id. § 401.1 (collecting authority).
157. See State v. Brewer, 195 Wis. 2d 295, 309, 536 N.W.2d 406, 412 (Ct. App. 1995)
("[E]xpert testimony ... provided the probative link between the gang graffiti and the crime
charged-that the graffiti evidence has a tendency to show drug activity.").
158. See supra text accompanying notes 134-38. See also Walter Dickey, Frank
Remington & David Schultz, Law, TrialJudges, and the Psychiatric Witness - Reflections on
How a Change in Legal Doctrine Has Been Implemented in Wisconsin, 3 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 331-41 (1980).
159. 194 Wis. 2d 122, 533 N.W.2d 476 (1995).
160. Id. at 129, 533 N.W.2d at 478.
161. Id. at 131-32, 533 N.W.2d at 479-80.
162. Id. at 154-55, 533 N.W.2d at 489.
163. Id. at 138, 533 N.W.2d at 482.
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In substance, McCarthy's

testimony constituted a quantified form of "other act" evidence offered
to prove that Honda's ATV was neither defective nor unreasonably
dangerous.
In reversing and ordering a new trial, the supreme court held that
evidence of "dissimilar modes of recreation or transportation" had "no

relevance to the manufacturer's duty of care with regard to the design,
manufacture, or sale of its particular product."' 65 The list of dissimilar
activities included "skiing, bicycle riding, scuba diving, football, and
passenger automobiles."' 66 Nothing in Bittner raised issues about

McCarthy's qualifications (which were impressive) or his application of
quantitative methodology."67 Moreover, his testimony was hardly within
the "ken" of lay knowledge and undoubtedly taught the jury much

about risk in the modern world. The present point is not, however, to
explore Bittner's approach to comparative risk evidence, especially in its
statistical form, but rather to emphasize that the court's holding rested
squarely on its determination of relevance under section 904.01.
The Bittner court had no occasion to discuss section 907.02 or the
relevancy test governing expert testimony. Indeed, Bittner's silence on

expert testimony in general only underscores the salience of its
relevancy

analysis."

Educated and experienced in engineering,

statistics, and risk assessment, McCarthy saw no difficulty in comparing
risks associated with ATVs to a broad range of conduct, including the

rollover rate of Corvettes.1 69 Yet it was the court's responsibility to
construe the acceptable sweep of "similar activities" and thereby decide
what an expert could, and could not, rely upon when comparing risk.

164. Id., 533 N.W.2d at 482.
165. Id. at 151, 533 N.W.2d at 487.
166. Id. The court ruled, however, that "although differing in design" the risk associated
with other recreational products, such as snowmobiles, minibikes, and trailbikes, could be
compared to ATVs because of their "similar purpose." Id. at 149, 533 N.W.2d at 487.
167. For McCarthy's credentials, see Exponent - Roger L. McCarthy,
http://www.exponent.com/leaders/bios/roger-mccarthy.asp?employeelD=96 (last visited Oct.
20, 2006).
168. Although section 904.03 is cited and discussed, the pertinent holding in Bittner is
squarely grounded in the relevancy determination itself. Section 907.02 is not cited or
discussed anywhere in the opinion.
169. Bittner, 194 Wis. 2d at 139, 533 N.W.2d at 482-83 ("McCarthy subsequently
compared the rollover rate of Corvettes to other passenger vehicles to demonstrate that
automobiles with a high center of gravity rollover with less frequency than automobiles, such
as the Corvette, with a low center of gravity because the rollover rate is attributable to the
driver rather than, as plaintiff's engineer suggested, to the design of the vehicle.").
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In sum, while experts may inform and enlighten courts on what
evidence may "tend" to prove, the trial judge ultimately determines
what the trier of fact may reasonably infer from the proof. The cases
discussed above are, in essence, instances in which expert witnesses
speak a language that cannot be translated in the courtroom. Irrelevant
evidence cannot, by definition, provide any assistance.17 ' The cases are
also consistent with the earlier discussion of authentication under the
conditional relevancy standard. Thus, the Bittner court effectively found
that no jury, acting reasonably, could find McCarthy's comparative risk
analysis reliable with respect to dissimilar activities.
Because
authentication is an aspect of relevancy generally, it follows that the
reliability of an expert's principles, methods, and tests should be
assessed not only under section 904.01 but also under the conditional
relevancy standards found in sections 901.04(2) and 909.01.
B. Is the Expert Qualified to Answer The Question?
What does it mean to "qualify" an "expert"? To begin with, what
must be qualified is not the witness (the person) on the stand as such,
but, more precisely, her testimony. And this testimony must consist of
specialized knowledge that is sufficiently reliable to be probative and of
assistance. 7 The specialized knowledge may be a product of her formal
education, training, experience or, more likely, a combination of these
factors. The issue of qualifications necessarily attaches to each and
every question asked of the witness; put differently, qualification should
be addressed on a question-by-question basis.
Ultimately, the
testimony's assistance to the trier of fact is a function of qualifications.
A witness's qualification to answer a question calling for specialized
7
knowledge is a preliminary question of admissibility for the trial judge. 1
On appeal this determination is given "substantial deference," but error
' 173
will be found where the trial court fails to exercise "sound discretion. ,
There are at least three prime considerations.
First, we must distinguish between the witness as a person and her
testimony. The law of evidence has long divided the world of testimony
into two discrete hemispheres-that of lay and expert testimony. Each
170. WIS. STAT. § 904.02 (2003-2004) (irrelevant evidence is inadmissible).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 76-98.
172. WiS. STAT. § 901.04(1) (2003-2004). See Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, 45, 246
Wis. 2d 67, 45,629 N.W.2d 698, 1 45.
173. Martindale,2001 WI 113,
28, 45, 246 Wis. 2d 67,
28, 45, 629 N.W.2d 698, $1
28, 45 (finding reversible error where the trial judge unreasonably concluded that the witness
was unqualified to offer certain testimony).
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hemisphere is distinct: lay testimony is a product of personal knowledge
gained through the five senses and expert testimony is predicated upon
specialized knowledge.174 Through centuries of practice, lawyers and

judges have become accustomed to the protocols of "qualifying" an
expert witness. In the trial practice literature it is often presented as an
exercise in eliciting the witness's curriculum vitae through testimony
about her background, education, training, and experience.'75 Case law

clearly establishes that "a witness's own testimony can establish the
witness's qualifications."' 76 The objective is to demonstrate that this is
no ordinary person whose testimony must otherwise be confined to the
realm of the lay witness, that is, to what she knows firsthand (most
often, what she saw with her eyes). Yet despite the convenience of this
legal shorthand, what must be qualified is not the witness qua witness
but her testimony. For example, a witness who happens to be the
plaintiff's treating physician offers little more than lay opinion testimony
when she testifies that the plaintiff suffered a laceration to her forehead

which later turned into a scar. But when the same witness testifies that
the scar will be permanent and plastic surgery will likely not erase the

,scar, she is now drawing upon specialized medical knowledge.
This takes us to a second point: qualifications should be approached
To be sure, the
question-by-question, not as a "field-finding."' 7
witness's education, training, and certification in a "field" may provide a
174. The 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence elevate the principled
distinction to dogma. Federal Rule of Evidence 701 defines the permissible scope of lay
opinion testimony by distinguishing it from expert testimony:
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
175. See, e.g., THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 323-27 (6th ed. 2002). It is
common to mark the witness's curriculum vitae ("CV") as an exhibit and ask her to march
through her education, experience, and publications (where applicable). Opponents who
blithely stipulate to the witness's CV may encounter formidable hurdles when they later
object to a witness's qualifications.
176. Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 1 94, 245 Wis. 2d 772, %94, 629
N.W.2d 727, T 94. The rule and practice is longstanding. See Holz, supra note 38, at 994
("The fact that one is licensed may be proved by the witness's own oral testimony.")
(collecting authority).
177. For a brief description of the older practice of "tender[ing] the witness as an
expert," see MAUET, supra note 175, at 327.
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convenient shorthand for determining the range of her specialized
knowledge. Yet the issue is never whether this witness is qualified as an
expert on some subject; rather, the question is what will this witness be
asked to tell the trier of fact and can she provide helpful answers?
Judges, then, need not and should not make a finding about the
witness's qualifications in a field such as engineering, medicine, or
economics. Such field-findings are not required by evidentiary rules or
case law, and are ultimately of little use. To return to the last example, a
finding that the witness is a qualified medical expert does not, by itself,
resolve whether she is qualified to testify about whether plastic surgery
will eliminate the scar."' If opposing counsel objects that a witness is
unqualified to answer a particular question, the judge will rule as to that
question. Ordinarily, the ruling should be made outside the jury's
presence. The federal Advisory Committee has wisely cautioned against
the practice of referring to a witness as an "expert," especially by the
judge:
The use of the term "expert" in [Rule 702] does not,
however, mean that the jury should actually be informed
that a qualified witness is testifying as an "expert."
Indeed, there is much to be said for a practice that
prohibits the use of the term "expert" by both the parties
and the court at trial. Such a practice "ensures that trial
courts do not inadvertently put their stamp of authority"
on a witness's opinion, and protects against the jury's
being "overwhelmed by the so-called 'experts."' ' 7 9
The efficacy of the question-by-question approach is best seen in
Martindalev. Ripp, which mandates this approach.'8" While stopped at a
traffic signal, Martindale's car was rear-ended by a "fully loaded
garbage truck."' 8' The critical issue at trial was whether the collision
caused Martindale's alleged jaw injury, more specifically, a
temporomandibular joint ("TMJ") injury." At trial he presented the
deposition testimony of Dr. Ryan, a board certified professor of oral
178. A family practitioner, for example, may lack the background and training in plastic
surgery needed to offer a reliable opinion.
179. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note on the 2000 amendments (citation
omitted).
180. See Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, 52, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 52, 629 N.W.2d 698,
52.
181. Id. 1 7,246 Wis. 2d 67, 7,629 N.W.2d 698, 7.
182. Id. 34, 246 Wis. 2d 67, $ 34, 629 N.W.2d 698, 34.
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and maxillofacial surgery at a medical school with over thirty-related
publications on the subject.183 The trial judge permitted Dr. Ryan's
opinion that the accident "caused the displacement of the discs in
[Martindale's] joint."' "
Nonetheless, the judge later excluded Dr.
Ryan's explanation about the movement of Martindale's head upon
impact and how this brought about the TMJ injury:
The circuit court agreed with the City that Dr. Ryan was
not qualified as an expert to give an opinion about
Martindale's head and jaw movement as a result of the
garbage truck striking his car from behind .... "[T]here
was no evidence that Ryan had any knowledge as to what
happened to Martindale in the collision-no knowledge
of the 'mechanics' of the accident or his actual injury, or
that the impact in fact caused a 'whiplash."' The court of
appeals noted that Dr. Ryan never inspected
Martindale's car (or a similar model) "and knew nothing
about Martindale's movements or what happened
to him
' 85
or the car at and after the moment of impact."'
A jury found that the City's garbage truck was not the cause of
Martindale's TMJ injury.'
The supreme court, in a decision authored by Justice Prosser,
reversed. First, the circuit court "recognized" Dr. Ryan's credentials
and admitted his opinion, but then unreasonably excluded Dr. Ryan's
explanation and reasoning for that very opinion.'87 This error denied
the jury the assistance it needed and "seriously undermined the
credibility of the expert's opinion."" 8 Second, Dr. Ryan had a sufficient
factual base upon which to make the opinion."' Third, the trial judge
erred by finding that Dr. Ryan lacked the "qualifications to give his
183. Id.
37, 246 Wis. 2d 67, J 37, 629 N.W.2d 698, 9137 (discussing Dr. Ryan's
credentials).
184. Id. T139, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 39, 629 N.W.2d 698, 1 39 (internal quotes omitted).
185. Id. 9143,246 Wis. 2d 67, 43,629 N.W.2d 698, 1 43 (citation omitted).
186. Id. 9135,246 Wis. 2d 67, 9135,629 N.W.2d 698, 9135.
187. ld. 9146, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 9 46, 629 N.W.2d 698, 1 46 ("After recognizing Dr. Ryan's
credentials, permitting him to testify as an expert, and allowing him to give his opinion as to
the cause of Martindale's medical condition, the court denied the expert the ability to explain
the 'mechanism' that prompted him to reach his conclusion. As a result, the trier of fact
never received an explanation of how whiplash could lead to the stretching and tearing of
ligament and the displacement of the discs that are part of the TMJs.").
188. Id., 246 Wis. 2d 67, 1 46,629 N.W.2d 698, T 46.
189. Id. T9 47-50, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 91947-50, 629 N.W.2d 698, TT 47-50.
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expert opinion as to how the accident occurred." 1" To the contrary, the
record showed, that Dr. Ryan was well qualified to give this opinion:
[Dr. Ryan] did not present himself as an accident expert.
The jury knew that he did not examine Martindale until
more than three years after the accident, and he did not
try to describe exactly what happened inside
Martindale's car. Instead, he was given certain facts
about the accident .... Dr. Ryan attempted to explain
"what could happen in a whiplash injury." His testimony
and the accompanying exhibit were intended to explain
to the jury how Dr. Ryan believed Martindale's
whiplash-related injuries occurred.'
The Martindale court contrasted Dr. Ryan's testimony with that of a
neurologist in Lemberger v. Koehring,'92 who stepped outside the
bounds of his qualifications when he opined that a "hard hat" may have
prevented the serious neurological injury suffered by the plaintiff in a
construction site accident. Although well-qualified to talk about the
injury and knowledgeable about "the basic laws of physics," the
neurologist "had no expertise or special knowledge on the capacity of193
a
hard hat to withstand impact and to prevent a skull injury."
Lemberger was "inapposite" to Martindale because Dr. Ryan stayed
within the bounds of his specialized knowledge.' 94 In short, "Dr. Ryan
testified that the whiplash injury caused the TMJ problem, not that the
accident had caused the whiplash injury":
If Dr. Ryan had tried to testify about the speed of the
garbage truck, the distances required to brake a garbage
truck at a particular speed, the physics of Martindale
pulling his car forward when he noticed the garbage
truck bearing down on him, the significance of the
garbage truck being fully loaded, the importance of a
particular angle of collision, or how fast Martindale's

190. Id. 51, 246 Wis. 2d 67, T 51, 629 N.W.2d 698, J 51.
191. Id. 55, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 55, 629 N.W.2d 698, 55.
192. 63 Wis. 2d 210, 216 N.W.2d 542 (1974).
193. Martindale, 2001 WI 113, T 54, 246 Wis. 2d 67, $ 54, 629 N.W.2d 698,
Lemberger, 63 Wis. 2d at 217-18, 216 N.W.2d at 546).
194. Id. 55, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 55, 629 N.W.2d 698, T 55.

54 (quoting

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[90:173

head snapped backward and then forward, the issue
would be different.1 95
Fourth, the circuit court also in effect "ruled that Dr. Ryan's
expertise in oral and maxillofacial surgery did not qualify him to give his
opinion about what is known as the 'occupant kinematics' of the
accident."'" Yet here too Dr. Ryan was qualified to assist the jury:
An accident reconstruction expert or an expert in
kinematics is not required for an elementary discussion
of whiplash, which is the abrupt jerking motion of the
head, either backward or forward. Expert testimony on
kinematics is not necessary to confirm the potential for
whiplash when a fully loaded garbage truck smashes into
a barely moving or stopped automobile, pushing it into
another vehicle, sending it 100 to 150 feet from the point
of origin, and causing $9000 in damages to the vehicle.
Requiring specialized expert testimony beyond a medical
expert in relatively simple automobile accident situations
would escalate the cost of presenting personal injury
cases without adequate justification. In short, it would
present a serious issue in the administration of the legal
system. 9
In sum, Martindale reveals the shortcomings of field-findings, which
often obfuscate more than elucidate. To be sure, the question-byquestion approach is potentially more time intensive: it compels the trial
court and counsel to consider carefully the witness's background,
education, and experience in light of the factual record and the
particular question before the witness-a complex task which may have
to be repeated for each separate opinion question, assuming opposing
counsel objects. Yet it is the surest way to assure that the trier of fact
receives the assistance it deserves to decide the case in a just and
rational manner.198
When considering expert qualifications, the third prime
consideration is how parties establish that a witness possesses
specialized knowledge that may assist the court. In almost all instances,

195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. J 56, 246 Wis.
Id. J[61, 246 Wis.
Id. 65, 246 Wis.
Id. 68,246 Wis.

2d 67, 56, 629
2d 67, 1 61, 629
2d 67, 1 65, 629
2d 67, 1 68, 629

N.W.2d
N.W.2d
N.W.2d
N.W.2d

698, 1
698,
698, $
698, 1

56.
61.
65.
68.
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the witness herself testifies about her background based on a r6sum6 or
curriculum vitae, which the proponent offers into evidence; diplomas
and certified copies of transcripts are not required.199 Further, the
witness does not need to be licensed or certified even if the profession
or calling requires such to practice.2 Section 907.02 broadly provides
that the witness's specialized knowledge may be a product of her

"experience, training, or education"; more simply, it may arise from her
"knowledge" or "skill."

For example, a medical student was found

sufficiently knowledgeable to explain the content of medical records."1
The case law provides numerous other illustrations.2'

Experience-based expert testimony presents unique problems.
Unlike medical doctors who can talk (endlessly) about academic
achievements, degrees, certifications, and the like, some witnesses'
backgrounds are rooted much more in "hands on" work (experience)
than any type of formal training."
Moreover, such a witness's
qualifications may overlap with the issue of whether his testimony falls
within the hemispheres of lay or expert testimony to begin with, a
critical point sometimes overlooked at the trial court. °" Difficult as they
are, these issues are entrusted to the trial judge's sound discretion as
preliminary questions of admissibility. And usually the baseline will be
the judge's own education, experience, and, most valuable, common
199. The rules of civil procedure may require that an expert incorporate his or her CV
into the expert's (mandatory) report, or at least provide considerable detail about education,
experience, etc. See BAICKER-McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK 602-03
(2006).
200. See, e.g., Kerkman v. Hintz, 142 Wis. 2d 404, 423, 418 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1988)
("[O]ne who is not licensed to practice chiropractic [sic] may testify regarding the standard of
care for a chiropractor if qualified as an expert in the area in which testimony will be given.").
See also BLINKA, supra note 28, § 702.4 (collecting authority). With respect to physicians, the
law was muddied through the 1960s until the supreme court held "that the qualification of an
expert witness is not a matter of licensure but of experience." Holz, supra note 38, at 992-93
(discussing and collecting authority). For the opposing viewpoint see, e.g., Bd. of Water &
Sewer Comm'r v. Hunter, No. CV-02-5952006, 2006 WL 2089914 (Ala. July 28, 2006) (finding
that an engineering expert witness must be a licensed engineer). My thanks to Attorney
Edward Hannan for the Alabama citation and his insight on this and so many other matters.
201. See Hagenkord v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 452, 463, 302 N.W.2d 421, 427 (1981)
(discussed infra at text accompanying notes 217).
202. See, e.g., Tanner v. Shoupe, 228 Wis. 2d 357, 596 N.W.2d 805, 814-15 (Ct. App.
1999) (finding that proffered expert who had taught auto mechanics, including instruction on
car batteries, and had worked with car batteries for over thirty years was qualified to testify
on some matters (e.g., the efficacy of warnings) but not others (battery design)). See generally
BLINKA, supra note 28, § 702.4.
203. See Black v. Gen. Elec. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 195, 278 N.W.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1979). See
also BLINKA, supra note 28, §§ 701.2, 702.4.
204. See BLINKA, supra note 28, § 702.4.
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Witnesses who offer
The foundation is straightforward.
sense.
experience-based expertise should be asked to describe with some

specificity what they do and how long they have been doing it. An
important benchmark is the closeness of the fit between what the
witness does and the disputed factual issues in the case. °5
Humility is not demanded of witnesses (or, for that matter, lawyers),
yet another unique issue concerns one who asserts specialized
knowledge on some questions but disclaims it as to others. For example,
in Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., a lawsuit for injuries caused by

latex gloves, a witness, Cacioli, "explained that he was an expert only in
manufacturing processes and quality control"; he "specifically denied
being an expert in the field of latex allergy. '' 206 Despite his disclaimer,
"the circuit court ruled that based on his background, Cacioli was
qualified to provide an expert opinion regarding the safety of various
protein levels in latex gloves. ' ,207 The supreme court held that this was
error (albeit harmless). The record failed to establish Cacioli's

specialized knowledge regarding the effects of varying protein levels.2 "
205. As discussed in the federal case law, "fit" describes "'whether expert testimony
proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in
resolving a factual dispute."' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993)
(quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).
206. 2001 WI 109, 92, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 92, 629 N.W.2d 727, 92.
207. Id., 245 Wis. 2d 772, 1 92, 629 N.W.2d 727, 92.
208. Id. 1 93, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 93, 629 N.W.2d 727, 93 ("To be sure, Cacioli knew of
and could manipulate protein levels in latex gloves, and had some knowledge of the language
and issues of the medical community that studied latex allergy. However, Cacioli was not a
medical doctor, had no formal experience, training, or education in latex allergy, and had no
first-hand knowledge of how or why various protein levels affected individuals. Instead, he
culled his knowledge by associating with and observing medical doctors and others who had
devoted their careers to the study of allergy and immunology. We cannot conclude from the
fact that Cacioli seems to have acquainted himself with people qualified to testify about the
effects of various protein levels in latex gloves that Cacioli was qualified to testify on this
subject."). In a concurring opinion that found no error in admitting Cacioli's testimony, Chief
Justice Abrahamson observed:
As to the first basis offered by the majority opinion, ample authority
exists for the proposition that an individual may be qualified to give
expert testimony based on association with and observation of
professionals in a particular field. Additionally, I see no support in the
case law for the majority's conclusion that Dr. Cacioli could not testify
because he "was not a medical doctor"; lacked "formal" experience,
training, or education in latex allergy; and did not have "first-hand
knowledge" of how latex proteins affect allergic individuals. Experience,
not licensure, is the key. Expertise may be derived from experience
working in a field of endeavor rather than from studies or diplomas. And
Dr. Cacioli's experience, training, and education in latex are extensive. I
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The court "accord[ed] great weight to the fact that Cacioli specifically
disclaimed any expertise regarding the safety of different protein levels
in latex gloves" and set forth the following standard:
The circuit court must accept this foundational testimony
unless "it finds the testimony not credible or there is
contrary credible evidence that undercuts the proffered
foundation." . . . [W]e hold that if a witness's own
testimony can establish the witness's qualifications, the
witness's testimony similarly might limit the witness's
qualifications.0 9
Of special importance is the caveat regarding "contrary credible
evidence." Many expert witnesses are retained by parties for the
purpose of providing testimony. Particularly on cross-examination, such
witnesses should not be permitted to shed tough questions, like a wet
labrador shaking off water, with a terse "that's-not-my-field" response.
Ultimately, "[w]hat matters is not the witness's view of self. Rather,
what matters is whether the circuit court determines in the exercise of its
discretion that the witness has the requisite experience, training, and
education to qualify as an expert in a court of law."21 A witness's
disclaimer of expertise should normally be a matter of weight, not
admissibility, and left to cross-examination and impeachment.
Nonetheless, the trial judge has the power to restrict such examinations
under the limited gatekeeping principle and especially where it appears
that the witness's testimony cannot assist the jury.
Finally, the signal importance of an expert's qualifications fully
justifies its status as a non-collateral subject of impeachment. The crossexaminer should be allowed wide-latitude in exploring the depth and
nature of the witness's specialized knowledge. Moreover, as a non-

am concerned that the majority's conclusion regarding Dr. Cacioli's
qualifications raises the bar in Wisconsin regarding who is qualified to
testify as an expert witness.
108, 629 N.W.2d 727, 108 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring)
Id. 108, 245 Wis. 2d 772,
(footnotes omitted).
209. Id. 94, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 94, 629 N.W.2d 727, $ 94 (majority opinion) (citations
omitted).
109 (Abrahamson, C.J.
210. Id. 1 109, 245 Wis. 2d 772, $ 109, 629 N.W.2d 727,
concurring).
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collateral issue, the cross-examiner may call other witnesses (extrinsic
proof) where needed to prove up the impeaching fact."'
In short, sections 901.04(1) and 907.02 compel the trial judge, upon

objection, to determine whether the witness is qualified to answer a
question that calls for specialized knowledge. The ruling rests firmly

within the discretion of the trial judge, but it is not one that exists in
isolation. Rather, the cardinal importance of the qualification element
is that it provides a baseline for gauging how much assistance the
witness may provide the jury. Put differently, whether the judge permits
the witness to provide "more" or "less" assistance depends to a
considerable extent on the witness's level of specialized knowledge.
C. Will the Testimony Assist the Trier of Fact In DeterminingA
ConsequentialIssue?
The "assistance" element is third in order for two very good reasons.
First, because all evidence must be relevant, as mandated by section
904.02, relevancy should be the initial consideration. And qualifications
are the second consideration because, as suggested above, they furnish

the baseline for calibrating expert assistance. To put the matter more
strongly, the elements of qualification and assistance relate to each
other much like an algebraic function: a witness's qualifications

comprise
the
domain
that in turn determines the range of possible
•
212
i
assistance.
And in selecting among the alternatives within this range,
the judge may apply the principles of limited gatekeeping in exercising
her discretion.
The assistance standard, then, compels consideration of what the
witness offers by way of specialized knowledge and what help the jury
may need. The judge literally controls the flow of expert information,

gauging the content of the witness's testimony on multiple factors,
211. See BLINKA supra note 28, §702.7. See also Ricco v. Riva, 2003 WI App 182, 17,
266 Wis. 2d 696, 17, 669 N.W.2d 193, T 17 (holding that while the expert may have been
playing "fast and loose with his qualifications," the trial court erred by finding the witness
"incredible as a matter of law" and "unqualified as a matter of law"). Ricco underscores that
defects in qualifications generally run to the weight of the evidence, from which it follows that
trial counsel must be given the full measure of evidentiary tools-wide latitude on crossexamination and extrinsic proof-in exposing them.
212. In mathematics an algebraic function "from a set X to a set Y is a correspondence
that assigns to each element of X exactly one element of Y." See Charles D. Miller &
Margaret L. Lial, Fundamentals of College Algebra 140 (2d ed. 1986). I am using "function"
in a less rigorous sense to emphasize that qualifications form the "domain" (set X) that
determines the "range" (set Y) of assistance. It is the linkage between X and Y that interests
me, not whether there is indeed only one Y value that corresponds with each X value.
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including qualifications, the complexity of the issues, and other evidence
in the case. Although no one factor is determinative and the range of
assistance is virtually limitless, some generalizations may be made.
Section 907.02 explicitly authorizes trial judges to determine whether
expert testimony, if allowed, should be in the form of an "opinion or
otherwise. 21 3 Broadly speaking, the expert's specialized knowledge
Expository
falls into two categories: exposition and opinion.214
testimony consists of a lecture or explanation on a specialized subject
such as economics, accounting, engineering, medicine, or psychology. It
is teaching or instruction on a matter of general (relevant) interest
without reference to the case-specific facts, as where a doctor defines
the term "compressed disc" while discussing back injuries. Opinion
testimony, by contrast, consists of the witness's application of her
specialized knowledge to the facts of the case, such as when our doctor
also testifies that the plaintiff had "in fact" suffered a compressed disc.
It is for the trial judge to determine the extent of the exposition or the
sweep of the witness's opinions, or whether the trier of fact needs any
specialized assistance at all. Regardless of the witness's qualifications
then, the judge determines whether she will be permitted to testify and,
if so, what the content of her testimony may be. This is the essence of
the assistance standard.
Expository testimony is well-established. It is contemplated by the
"or otherwise" language in section 907.02 and deeply rooted in the case
law, which recognizes that expert assistance need not always take the
form of opinion testimony. " The Wisconsin Supreme Court, drawing
from the federal Advisory Committee, has itself lectured on the value of
expert exposition without opinions:
"Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only
in the form of opinions. The assumption is logically
unfounded. The rule accordingly recognizes that an
expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition
of scientific or other principles relevant to the case,

213. Wis. Stat. § 907.02 (2003-2004).
214. See BLINKA, supra note 28, §§ 702.501 (exposition), 702.502 (opinion).
215. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (explaining that the 2000
(Daubert-induced) amendments did not "alter the venerable practice of using expert
testimony to educate the fact finder on general principles. For this kind of generalized
testimony, Rule 702 simply requires that: (1) the expert be qualified; (2) the testimony
address a subject matter on which the factfinder can be assisted by an expert; (3) the
testimony be reliable; and (4) the testimony 'fit' the facts of the case.").
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leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Since
much of the criticism of expert testimony has centered
upon the hypothetical question, it seems wise to
recognize that opinions are not indispensable and to
encourage the use of expert testimony in nonopinion
form when counsel believes the trier can itself draw the

requisite inference."

216

The extent of the exposition is itself discretionary and will often turn on
the witness's qualifications. Thus, it was appropriate to permit a
medical student, who happened to be in the courtroom observing a trial,
to take the stand and define various terms that appeared in medical
records that had been admitted into evidence. Although he lacked a
medical degree (and license) and, most remarkably, had not been
retained by either party, the medical student nonetheless possessed
sufficient knowledge to assist the jury in understanding the hospital
records.2 7
Most often, however, parties retain experts precisely for the purpose
of offering opinion testimony in addition to whatever exposition may be
needed to explain the expert's reasoning. And, assuming a proper
objection, the trial judge faces the formidable task of deciding the scope
and content of any testimony. The judge's discretionary control over
the flow of specialized knowledge-allowing none, exposition only,
some opinions and reasoning-has been most frequently discussed in
cases involving what may be loosely termed credibility experts.
Although a detailed discussion of those cases is beyond the scope of this
Article, they exhibit a creative, nuanced approach to providing
assistance to juries regarding the credibility of certain classes of
witnesses, chiefly victims of sexual assault, child abuse, and domestic
violence who often wait before reporting crimes, sometimes convey
inconsistent accounts, and occasionally recant their allegations before

216. Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 459, 285 N.W.2d 868, 872 (1979) (quoting Sup.
Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R207-08 (1973); accord FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's
note).
217. Hagenkord v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 452, 463, 302 N.W.2d 421, 427 (1981). The medical
student was observing the trial while on a break from classes and had absolutely no
connection to the case before he testified. During a recess and upon learning of the student's
background in a chance conversation, the prosecutor called him as a witness to explain
various terms in the voluminous medical records (thereby furthering the education of both
the medical student and the jury). This insight comes from former circuit court judge Michael
Malmstadt, who was the prosecutor who called the medical student.
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trial. 8 To help better understand such puzzling conduct, the judge may
permit a properly qualified expert to educate the jury about victims'
reactive behavior in general without reference to the particular offense
or victim (exposition). 19 Depending on the circumstances, the judge
may also permit the expert to testify about the pertinent behavior
exhibited by the victim in this case and even allow expert opinion
testimony about whether this particular victim's behavior is "consistent"
with that observed in the class of victims generally."0 Such assistance is
especially useful when the opponent has relied on "widely held
misconceptions about [the behavior of] sexual assault victims," for
example,22' a point that neatly illustrates why this must be a factintensive inquiry entrusted to the trial judge's sound discretion. In no
event may the expert testify that the victim is "truthful" or that the
"crime" occurred.222
Although the credibility cases arise from criminal trials, the
principles are fully applicable to the wide range of expert testimony in
civil litigation. Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., discussed earlier,
focused on the witness's qualifications, but at bottom involved a
disagreement among the justices about whether this witness could assist
the jury. 223 In Tanner v. Shoupe, the court held that an experience-based
expert on car batteries was qualified to answer two of four critical issues,
thus illustrating that qualifications affect the permissible range of expert
assistance. 224
In sum, trial judges are granted enormously broad discretion in
determining whether the trier of fact may profit from expert assistance
and, if so, the precise form and content of that assistance. The witness's
qualifications present the range of possible assistance from which the
judge will select, a discretionary determination guided by the limited
gatekeeping function. The options may range from total exclusion (this
218. See BLINKA, supra note 28, § 608.3 (collecting and discussing cases).
219. See State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 333, 431 N.W.2d 165, 172 (1988).
220. See State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 256-57, 432 N.W.2d 913, 920 (1988).
221. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d at 335, 431 N.W.2d at 173.
222. See State v. Tutlewski, 231 Wis. 2d 379, 389, 605 N.W.2d 561, 566 (Ct. App. 1999).
223. See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 190, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629
N.W.2d 727. See supra text accompanying note 206-09. The concurring opinion would have
found no error in the admission of the expert's testimony, which the majority found harmless
in any event.
224. 228 Wis. 2d 351, 369-75, 596 N.W.2d 805, 813-15 (Ct App. 1999) (holding that the
trial court reasonably excluded opinion testimony regarding battery design and what caused
the battery to explode, but the witness should have been permitted to testify about issues
involving a "vent cap" and the inadequacy of warnings on the battery).
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witness has nothing to add) to exposition or opinion testimony. And in
making this determination, the trial judge will be immeasurably assisted
by lawyers who understand the case far better than the judge and who
use thoughtful objections and offers of proof to craft reasonable
alternatives.
VII. RETUNING THE RELEVANCY TEST: SOME SUGGESTIONS

The prevailing relevancy test has successfully governed the
admissibility of expert testimony for decades. It is a rule that manifests
great trust in the adversary trial and the skill and ability of trial lawyers
to elucidate the strengths and weaknesses of expert testimony for the
trier of fact. The appellate cases have revealed no intractable problems
that warrant a sea change in Wisconsin evidence law, particularly the
adoption of the federal reliability standard. And it is noteworthy, if not
ironic, that despite the blame traditionally assigned, like a medieval
witch's mark, to the personal injury plaintiff's bar for unloading "junk
science" into the courtroom, the most troublesome Wisconsin appellate
cases have involved criminal cases and a defendant's use of expert
evidence in a civil case.225 Nor has there been any careful study of trial
court decision making that points to insuperable problems with present
policy.
Moreover, the federal reliability test is fundamentally flawed. First,
the standard itself is unstable and difficult to apply, which has resulted
in inconsistent, sometimes capricious decisions. 6
Second, what
seemingly attracts its champions, despite the test's shortcomings, is that
the federal reliability standard has become a formidable "casedispositive" tool, or perhaps weapon, at the summary judgment stage.
Put differently, parties use the rule in conjunction with summary
judgment motions to exclude expert testimony that is otherwise needed
to prove a prima facie case. The attraction is not simply the capricious
nature of Rule 702 reliability rulings (Why not take a chance, maybe
we'll prevail?), but the great deference accorded evidentiary rulings, as
distinct from the summary judgment ruling itself, on appeal. Most
importantly, unlike trial where the Q&A is oral and counsel must
identify and frame objections in scant seconds (or less), pretrial motion
225. See supra text accompanying notes 157-67. See Bittner v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
194 Wis. 2d 122, 533 N.W.2d 476 (1995); Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).
My criteria for "troublesome" is the courts' determination that the expert evidence in a case
was essentially irrelevant and completely unhelpful to the trier of fact.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 56-66.
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practice permits lawyers to spend weeks poring over opposing experts'
reports and depositions like medieval glossators.

Careful, elaborate

objections are composed in writing with a precision unthinkable during
trial. Enormous burdens and unrealistic expectations are placed on trial
judges. The strategy then is simple: use Rule 702 to exclude the
opposition's critical expert testimony and then demand summary

judgment.
To be sure, summary judgment motions are paired with evidentiary
motions in limine in Wisconsin state practice, but with a critical
difference.

Disputes about the reliability of an expert's principles or

methods are seldom case-dispositive at the summary judgment stage;
rather, they will ordinarily be resolved by the jury unless the trial judge
finds reason to exclude or limit the testimony in accordance with the
relevancy rule and the limited gatekeeping principle. And here the

focus is where it should be, namely, does the expert's testimony assist
the trier of fact in resolving consequential issues? The judge then is not
forced into the quagmire of resolving scientific or other technical
disputes among qualified experts and about which the judge likely
knows little.227
227. Although these musings about Daubert and summary judgment are beyond the
scope of this Article, several points are pertinent. First, the Supreme Court's trilogy of expert
cases-Daubert, General Electric v. Joiner, and Kurnho Tire-were all summary judgment
cases. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). Second,
commentators have also observed that evidentiary rulings have increased the number of
summary judgment adjudications. See GIANNELLI, supra note 8, § 24.04[4]. The North
Carolina Supreme Court expressed "concern[] with the case-dispositive nature of Daubert
proceedings, whereby parties in civil actions may use pre-trial motions to exclude expert
testimony under Daubert to bootstrap motions for summary judgment that otherwise would
not likely succeed." Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 691 (N.C. 2004)
(collecting authority). It further explained:
Procedurally, this imbalance may be explained because trial courts apply
different evidentiary standards when ruling on motions to exclude expert
testimony and motions for summary judgment. In a motion for summary
judgment, the evidence presented to the trial court must be admissible at
trial, N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (2003), and must be viewed in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Where there are genuine,
conflicting issues of material fact, the motion for summary judgment must
be denied so that such disputes may be properly resolved by the jury as
the trier of fact.
Not so in the case of preliminary motions to exclude expert testimony
under Daubert,which are resolved under Rule of Evidence 104(a). Here,
trial courts are not bound by the rules of evidence, are not required to
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This is not to say, however, that the relevancy test is flawless or has
remained unchanged. Although Wisconsin courts remain steadfastly
supportive of the relevancy approach, at least in its broad outlines, the
standard has been both enriched and subtly changed in the course of a
continuing dialogue over alternative rules, especially the federal
reliability standard and the Frye test. For this reason, it is more accurate
to say that the relevancy test has been retuned. A wholesale revision, to
repeat, is simply not warranted by our decades of experience with the
relevancy test. Yet the increasing use of expert testimony on a broad
range of issues has surfaced palpable concerns that it is sometimes
unreasonably time-consuming, confusing, and unfairly prejudicial.
Wisconsin case law has staked itself to a middle ground that is
somewhere between the extremes of a laissez-faire "free proof" (let it
all go to weight) approach and the capriciously rigid federal reliability
standard.
Wisconsin case law provides trial courts with broad discretionary
tools for regulating and limiting expert testimony while remaining
faithful to an assistance standard that values informed fact finding. An
outline for analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony is apparent;
the analytic framework is not, however, something that judges are
expected to apply sua sponte whenever a party proffers expert
testimony. Rather, it is trial counsel's role to make timely objections
based on pretrial discovery and a mastery of facts and strategy that the
trial judge simply cannot possess. The proponent's response should
offer a theory of admissibility that responds to the opponent's specific

view the evidence in a light favorable to the non-movant, and may
preliminarily resolve conflicting issues of fact relevant to the Daubert
admissibility ruling. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 104(a). Taking advantage of
these procedural differences, a party may use a Daubert hearing to
exclude an opponent's expert testimony on an essential element of the
cause of action. With no other means of proving that element of the
claim, the non-moving party would inevitably perish in the ensuing
motion for summary judgment. By contrast, a party who directly moves
for summary judgment without a preliminary Daubert determination will
not likely fare as well because of the inherent procedural safeguards
favoring the non-moving party in motions for summary judgment.
Id. at 692 (citations omitted). The court's ultimate concern was that the "sweeping pre-trial
'gatekeeping' authority under Daubert may unnecessarily encroach upon the constitutionallymandated function of the jury to decide issues of fact and to assess the weight of the
evidence." Id. Echoing an argument that applies in Wisconsin as well, the North Carolina
approach was not "in need of repair" and, in any event, offered a rule that was more
"flexible" and "workable" than the federal approach. See id. at 692-93.
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objection. In short, the considerations described below are points of
engagement for counsel, not a blueprint.
First, the trial judge should determine whether the expert's
testimony is relevant, a consideration that embraces both the definition
of relevancy under section 904.01 and the issue of authentication under
section 909.01.22 Objections that the expert's reasoning, methods, or
tests, including their application, are unsound, speculative, or uncertain
normally raise issues of conditional relevancy. The trial judge must
determine whether a jury, acting reasonably, could find the expert's
reasoning and methods reliable.229 The conditional relevancy doctrine, it
is contended, provides a more than adequate firewall against "junk"
experts without imposing the burdens associated with the federal rule.
Nonetheless, the various Daubert "factors" (e.g., peer reviewed?
developed for litigation?2") may inform the analysis under the wide
umbrella of conditional relevancy, which asks only whether a reasonable
jury could find the testimony reliable. One may anticipate that expert
testimony will only rarely fail conditional relevancy scrutiny if only
because seasoned trial lawyers will seldom offer evidence so lacking in
probative force (especially such expensive evidence). And even when
they fail, such challenges may bring to light the marginal probative value
of proffered expert testimony and the attendant risks-such as unfair
prejudice or confusion-it creates, which may, in turn, inform whether it
will assist the trier of fact and the judge's ruling as limited gatekeeper.
Section 904.01, the definition of relevancy, will most often be implicated
where the objection is that the expert's testimony, whether by
exposition or opinion, has no bearing on the facts of consequence.231
Second, the witness must be shown to have specialized knowledge
based on education, training, or experience.232 This is a preliminary
question of admissibility for the trial judge that should be approached
on a question-by-question basis; "field" findings are neither necessary
nor particularly helpful. In any event, the jury need not, and should not,
be informed of the judge's finding about the witness's qualifications.
Finally, weaknesses, limitations, or defects in the witness's qualifications
are a non-collateral issue for impeachment purposes. Wide-latitude on

228.
229.
230.
231.
relevancy
232.

See supra text accompanying notes 149-70.
See supra text accompanying notes 76-98.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-55.
Unlike the "shared governance" of conditional relevancy, a determination of
under section 904.01 is a preliminary question of admissibility for the judge alone.
See supra text accompanying notes 171-211.
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cross-examination, along with extrinsic evidence where needed, should
be permitted.
The nature and depth of the witness's specialized knowledge is
critical to the third element: What assistance may this witness provide
the trier of fact? It is contended that qualifications and assistance are
paired in a functional relationship.2 3 Qualifications (the domain) will
determine the range of potential expert assistance. And it is in the
judge's capacity as limited gatekeeper that he or she will determine what
form that assistance may take: (1) no testimony; (2) exposition alone; or
(3) various opinions. In exercising this discretion the judge may
consider the section 904.03 balancing test, which excludes evidence
where its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice
or confusion of the issues. Yet section 907.02's assistance standard
provides an independent, more free-ranging grant of discretion that
assesses the testimony's probative value against other factors, including
whether it is superfluous, confusing, or a waste of time. Here there is no
bias in favor of admissibility. Rather, the trial court may shape the form
and content of the expert's testimony to assure it provides assistance
while respecting those other concerns.
Finally, it cannot be gainsaid that the relevancy test demands active,
engaged trial lawyers who can assist the court in working through these
issues. Absent an objection, of course, the expert's testimony is
admissible and the jury is free to give it whatever weight it deems
appropriate.
Discovery procedures provide ample avenues for
discovering an expert's opinions, bases, and reasoning.' Trial counsel
will seldom be caught without adequate notice of what the opponent's
expert may say. Limited gatekeeping, particularly the assistance
determination, may often be enhanced by motions in limine that
educate the judge about both potential objections and theories of
admissibility. Unlike the federal rule, where the court's energies are
usually employed in the name of avoiding trials through summary
judgment, the relevancy rule's focus is how to better educate the trier of
fact at trial.

233. See supra text accompanying notes 212-24.
234. See, e.g., WIS. STATS. §§ 804.01(2)(d), 971.23(1)(e), (2m)(am) (2003-2004).

